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Adverse Possession of Identity:
Radical Theory,
Conventional Practice
The doctrine of adverse possession is an outlier in the rigidand formalistic realm of property law.  Adverse possession
rewards the squatter who pulls off a successful performance as
the true owner of a piece of property, to the disadvantage of the
original owner.  Adverse possession, however, is not the only le-
gal doctrine that confers legal status on those who are merely
acting as if  they have that legal status.  Other familiar doctrines,
such as common law marriage, provide recognition, and the ac-
companying rights and duties, to those who act as if  they are hus-
band and wife.  But sometimes acting as if  is not enough.  If a
person who comports herself as a woman is deemed to be a bio-
logical “man,” she may find herself fired, without legal recourse,
if she tries to come to work wearing a dress.1
When is acting as if  one had legal status sufficient to secure
that status in the eyes of the law?  What normative rationales
have been put forth by courts and commentators for transform-
ing de facto performances into de jure protections?  When
should the law formalize a performance?  This Article will take
up these questions in three contexts: property law, family law,
and the law of sex and race determination.  Adverse possession
confers property ownership on trespassers who have occupied
land for a given period of time.  Common law marriage statutes
treat a couple as married upon dissolution of the relationship or
death of one spouse, if that couple has behaved as if married for
a certain amount of time.  The evolving legal concept of func-
tional parenthood grants custody rights to persons who fulfill
* Law Clerk, Hon. Shira A. Scheindlin, U.S. District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.  J.D. 2003, Yale Law School.  The author wishes to thank Kenji
Yoshino for his invaluable comments and suggestions.
1 See, e.g. , Doe v. Boeing, 846 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1993).
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caretaking roles for children, even if those persons are not legal
parents.  Doctrines of race determination in the nineteenth cen-
tury conferred legal rights to those who successfully acted out
social expectations for behavior of white persons.
In each case, the elements of a legal claim are strikingly simi-
lar: physical proximity, notoriety and publicity, a claim of right,
consistent and continuous behavior, and public acquiescence.
Moreover, while the law protects the interests of the parties im-
mediately concerned, protection of third-party interests and so-
cial expectations turns out to be the dispositive factor in each
case.
This Article will also examine what is at stake when legal doc-
trines acquiesce to public performances, a phenomenon I will re-
fer to as “performance reification.”  The theory behind
performance reification seems to be that the law is public en-
forcement of a preexisting natural status or private arrangement.
Law is not constitutive of that natural status or private arrange-
ment.  However, the doctrines of performance reification demon-
strate that a legal doctrine can give shape to the very social
behaviors that it attempts to describe.  Indeed, these doctrines
raise fundamental and profound questions about the nature of
property, marriage, the family, and racial and gender identity.
What distinguishes property from theft, marriage from prostitu-
tion, parenthood from kidnapping, passing from whiteness, male-
to-female transsexuals from women?  Is the difference one of pri-
vate rights, social judgments, or legal forms?
At first glance, it appears that performance reification is a rad-
ical idea and a subversive phenomenon.  By recognizing mere
performance, these doctrines suggest that there is no underlying,
extralegal, stable essence to property, marriage, parenthood, race
and gender.  Thus, the theory goes, these doctrines should open
social conventions and legal institutions to contestation.  How-
ever, upon closer examination, it becomes apparent that such
performance reification might simultaneously and unpredictably
shore up the power of the underlying norm to exact conformity
from individuals.  To the extent that courts are only counting a
certain performance as worthy of reification, they are condition-
ing the grant of rights on conformity to a particular social norm.
Individuals find that they must accede to many limitations in or-
der to be cognizable as rights-bearing subjects.  Therefore, I con-
tend that doctrines of performance reification should be
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approached cautiously by anyone who seeks progressive social
change.
In Part I of this Article, I outline the symmetry between the
doctrinal elements of adverse possession law, common law mar-
riage, and functional parenthood, and examine the policy ratio-
nales for each doctrine.  I extend this analysis to the historical
doctrines of race determination in slavery and segregation cases,
which bear a surprising similarity to adverse possession.  Part I
further analyzes contemporary doctrines of sex determination, in
which performance is consistently inadequate to guarantee legal
recognition.  In Part II, I apply two legal theories: formalism and
realism, in an attempt to build a conceptual framework to ex-
plain these doctrines.  However, the analysis provided by these
legal theories is incomplete, so I draw on Judith Butler’s theory
of gender performativity to demonstrate that the law here is en-
gaged in recognizing a successful public performance.  In turn,
Part III analyzes the subversive and conservative aspects of per-
formance reification to conclude that these doctrines are more
likely to preserve conformist community expectations than to
open social norms to contestation.  Lastly, Part IV concludes that
“one-size-fits-all” legal institutions, such as property, marriage,
parenthood, whiteness, and sexual identity, should only be im-
posed upon ambiguous performances when strong third-party in-
terests are at stake.
I
ANALOGOUS DOCTRINES OF
PERFORMANCE REIFICATION
Under what conditions is acting as if  one was an owner, a
spouse, a parent, or a white person sufficient for a court to recog-
nize one’s legal status as such?  Interesting parallels emerge from
comparison of the doctrines of adverse possession, common law
marriage, functional parenthood, and trials of race determina-
tion.  Interestingly, a similar doctrine of performance reification
is not apparent from the case law on sex determination.
A. Property Law
1. Adverse Possession: Acting like an Owner
Adverse possession is the transfer of a legal interest in prop-
erty from the original owner to one who has acted as if  she
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owned the land for a certain period of time, regardless of
whether or not that person actually has title to the land.  Carol
Rose offers the following example:
Suppose I own a lot in the mountains, and some stranger to
me, without my permission, builds a house on it, clears the
woods, and farms the lot continuously for a given period, say
twenty years.  During that time, I am entitled to go to court to
force him off the lot.  But if I have not done so at the end of
twenty years, or some other period fixed by statute, not only
can I not sue him for recovery of what was my land, but the
law recognizes him as the title owner.2
Courts in most jurisdictions have developed a series of fairly
uniform requirements for adverse possession, including “(1) an
actual entry giving exclusive possession that is (2) open and noto-
rious, (3) adverse and under a claim of right, and (4) continuous
for the statutory period.”3
An adverse possessor acts like a true owner: “the sort of entry
and exclusive possession  that will ripen into title by adverse pos-
session is use of the property in the manner that an average true
owner would use it under the circumstances.”4  One court ex-
plained, “[i]t has become firmly established that the requisite
possession requires such possession and dominion ‘as ordinarily
marks the conduct of owners in general in holding, managing,
and caring for property of like nature and condition.’”5  The ad-
verse possessor must send a clear signal: acting like the owner in
a way that is consistent and continuous throughout the statutory
period.6
The notoriety requirement shapes which acts are sufficient to
establish adverse possession.  The acts must establish that the ad-
verse possessor holds herself out as the legitimate formal owner
of the property.  Although building a house, farming the land, or
putting up a fence may support a case for adverse possession,
these are not prerequisites.  Acting like a land owner can mean
merely mimicking the legal formalities of land ownership.  In the
classic case of adverse possession, Lessee of Ewing v. Burnet , the
2 Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property , 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 73, 79
(1985).
3 JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 131 (4th ed. 1998).
4 Id.
5 Howard v. Kunto, 477 P.2d 210, 213-14 (Wash. Ct. App. 1970), overruled on
other grounds by  Chaplin v. Sanders, 676 P.2d 831, 861 n.2 (Wash. 1984) (citation
omitted).
6 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra  note 3, at 131. R
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adverse possessor, Ewing, claimed a sand and gravel lot adjacent
to his property.7  Ewing paid taxes on the lot, claimed the exclu-
sive right of digging and removing sand and gravel, made leases
to others to remove the sand and gravel, and brought actions of
trespass against others who attempted to remove sand and gravel
without his permission.8  As the Supreme Court stated:
Neither actual occupation, cultivation nor residence, are nec-
essary to constitute actual possession, when the property is so
situated as not to admit of any permanent useful improve-
ment, and the continued claim of the party has been evidenced
by public acts of ownership, such as he would exercise over
property which he claimed in his own right, and would not
exercise over property which he did not claim.9
Not only must the adverse possessor hold herself out to other
potential owners as the rightful owner of the land, but the public
must accept the adverse possessor as the owner.  No claim of
ownership will succeed unless the adverse possessor’s presence
on the property is exclusive.  If the original owner reenters or
brings a successful ejectment action before the end of the time
period set by the statute of limitations, the claim of adverse pos-
session fails.10
2. Rationales for Adverse Possession
What is the rationale behind adverse possession law?  Some
have suggested that it rewards the productive use of land.11
However, this explanation does not explain why the common law
requires that adverse possession be open, notorious, and under a
claim of right.  In Ewing , activities by the adverse possessor mim-
icking the legal role of a true owner, such as ejecting trespassers
and paying taxes, established adverse possession.  If productive
use of land is the rationale, why does the law reward these activi-
ties, neither of which is necessarily pro-development?  The re-
7 36 U.S. 41, 49 (1837).
8 Id.
9 Id.  at 53.
10 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra  note 3, at 131. R
11 Henry W. Ballantine, Title by Adverse Possession,  32 HARV. L. REV. 135, 135
(1918) (“It has been suggested . . . that the policy is to reward those using the land in
a way beneficial to the community.”). See  John G. Sprankling, An Environmental
Critique of Adverse Possession,  79 CORNELL L. REV. 816, 816 (1994) (“The doctrine
is . . . dominated by a prodevelopment nineteenth century ideology that encourages
and legitimates economic exploitation—and thus environmental degradation—of
wild lands.”).
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quirement that a claim be public indicates that the underlying
justification is certainty  in land ownership.  Thomas Merrill gives
four certainty-related justifications for adverse possession law:
“the problem of lost evidence, the desirability of quieting titles,
the interest in discouraging sleeping owners, and the reliance in-
terests of [adverse possessors] and interested third persons.”12
Adverse possession law is designed to protect the reliance in-
terests of the possessor.  Open and notorious trespassing puts the
original owner “on notice” that she should complain in order to
assert her rights to the property.  If the owner does not attempt
to eject the adverse possessor within the time period set by the
statute of limitations, the adverse possessor should be able to as-
sume that she can act as the new owner of the property without
disruption.  Joseph Singer explains:
The possessor has come to expect continued access to the
property and the true owner has fed those expectations by her
actions (or her failure to act).  It is morally wrong for the true
owner to allow a relationship of dependence to be established
and then to cut off the dependent party.13
The law protects the reliance interests of the adverse posses-
sor.  Nonetheless, commentators find the doctrine troubling inso-
far as it rewards squatters and punishes rightful owners.14  The
common law does not even require that the adverse possessor act
under a good-faith belief of ownership.15  Accordingly, it rewards
12 Thomas W. Merrill, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession , 79
NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1133 (1984).
13 Joseph W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property,  40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 667
(1988).  Holmes commented, “Sometimes it is said that, if a man neglects to enforce
his rights, he cannot complain if, after a while, the law follows his example.”  Oliver
Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law,  10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 476 (1897).
14 Holmes, supra  note 13, at 476.  (“[W]hat is the justification for depriving a man R
of his rights, a pure evil as far as it goes, in consequence of the lapse of time?”);
Ballantine, supra  note 11, at 135 (“[T]he doctrine apparently affords an anomalous R
instance of maturing a wrong into a right contrary to one of the most fundamental
axioms of the law.”).
15 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra  note 3, at 133.  It is unclear if a particular subjec- R
tive intent is required by the claim of right element.  Margaret Radin lists three
possibilities:  “(1) state of mind is irrelevant; (2) the required state of mind is, ‘I
thought I owned it’; (3) the required state of mind is, ‘I thought I did not own it [and
intended to take it].”  Margaret Jane Radin, Time, Possession, and Alienation,  64
WASH. U. L.Q. 739, 746-47 (1986).  Some empirical research indicates that “where
courts allow adverse possession to ripen into title, bad faith on the part of the pos-
sessor seldom exists.  Where the possessor knows that he is trespassing, valid title
does not accrue to him simply by the passage of years.”  R.H. Helmholz, Adverse
Possession and Subjective Intent , 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 347 (1983). But see  Roger
A. Cunningham, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent: A Reply to Professor
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even the bad-faith adverse possessor who defrauds the commu-
nity into believing that she is the true owner of property belong-
ing to another.
Considerations other than the reliance interests of the adverse
possessor must be pivotal, such as the public’s interest in a clear
system of land titles and the interests of third parties who rely on
the representations of adverse possessors.  Rose states succinctly
why certainty in ownership is a public good: “clear titles facilitate
trade and minimize resource-wasting conflict.”16  Land, as a du-
rable resource, “sticks around indefinitely, while claims against
land can go on and on, in layer after layer, to be lost, found,
banished, restored, relished, then lost again to longstanding prac-
tice and prescription.”17  Adverse possession is necessary to any
practical system of property rights in land as a “claim-clearing
doctrine.”18  Vagueness in land ownership is inefficient.  Rose ex-
plains, “[s]ociety is worst off in a world of vague claims; if no one
knows whether he can safely use the land, or from whom he
should buy it if it is already claimed, the land may end up being
used by too many people or by none at all.”19  Another rationale
for adverse possession is to protect the interests of third parties
who act in reliance on the appearance that the adverse possessor
is the owner of the property, such as the people who contracted
with Ewing to remove sand and gravel from his lot.20
Thus, adverse possession is essential to property as an institu-
tion.  Felix Cohen defined property as “a relationship among
human beings such that the so-called owner can exclude others
from certain activities or permit others to engage in those activi-
ties and in either case secure the assistance of the law in carrying
out his decision.”21  Because property is an agreement among
people over a resource, clear communication and community
Helmholz , 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1 (1986) (arguing that the cases surveyed do not sup-
port Helmholz’s conclusions).
16 Rose, supra  note 2, at 81; see also PAUL E. BASYE, CLEARING LAND TITLES R
§ 54 (2d ed. 1970) (claiming that adverse possession’s purpose is to quiet titles);
Ballantine, supra  note 11, at 135 (“[T]he great purpose is automatically to quiet all
titles which are openly and consistently asserted, to provide proof of meritorious
titles, and correct errors in conveyancing.”) .
17 Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or, Blackstone’s Anxiety,  108 YALE
L.J. 601, 614 (1998).
18 Id.
19 Rose, supra  note 2, at 78. R
20 See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra  note 3, at 135. R
21 Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property , 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 373
(1954).
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agreement is crucial.  Rose calls this the “consent theory” of
property rights: “the community requires clear acts so that it has
the opportunity to dispute claims, but may be thought to acqui-
esce in individual ownership where the claim is clear and no ob-
jection is made.”22  At the root of property is a clear act of
possession, and possession is at its core speech: communication
to others.23  Rose claims that “the clear-act principle suggests
that the common law defines acts of possession as some kind of
statement.  As Blackstone said, the acts must be a declaration of
one’s intent to appropriate.”24  Property is “a kind of speech”
and adverse possession requires “the acquiring party to keep on
speaking, lest he lose his title.”25
However, adverse possession also creates anxiety about the in-
stitution by laying bare a fundamental dilemma in the theory of
property.  If the origin of property is “the agreement among men
legalizing what each had already grabbed, without any right to do
so, and granting, for the future, a formal right of ownership to
the first grabber,” how is property any different from theft?26
Rose explains, “The hidden skeleton in property’s closet is what I
shall call the Ownership Anxiety—that is, anxiety over the foun-
dations for existing distributions.”27  Tracing title back into antiq-
uity reveals that modern claims to ownership are based on
unstable ground.
B. Family Law
1. Common law Marriage: Acting like Husband and Wife
The typical case of a common law marriage involves a
cohabitating couple that never made it to the chapel, and yet
lived together, shared a surname, maintained joint finances, held
themselves out as husband and wife, raised children together,
and listed each other as spouses on various legal and employ-
ment forms.28  One spouse sues for recognition of marriage upon
22 Rose, supra  note 2, at 77. R
23 Id.  at 78.
24 Id.  at 77.
25 Id.  at 79.
26 RICHARD SCHLATTER, PRIVATE PROPERTY: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 131
(Rutgers Univ. Press 1951).
27 Rose, supra  note 17, at 605. R
28 John B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon Over for Common-Law Marriage: A Con-
sideration of the Continued Viability of the Common-Law Marriage Doctrine,  29
CUMB. L. REV. 399, 409-10 (1998-1999).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-2\ORE205.txt unknown Seq: 9 18-NOV-05 13:17
Adverse Possession of Identity 571
the death of the other spouse or dissolution of the relationship.
Under the doctrine of common law marriage, a court may hold
that the couple was legally married because they had been acting
like it.29
Although the specific legal elements of a common law mar-
riage vary from state to state, generally, claimants must demon-
strate capacity and agreement to marry, as well as cohabitation.30
Furthermore, they must show that they “‘held themselves out’ to
the public as married, and gained acceptance within their com-
munity as husband and wife.”31  These elements, although not
exactly symmetrical, all have rough analogues with the elements
of adverse possession.32
The element of cohabitation, considered a hallmark of marital
behavior, parallels the element of actual entry, occupancy of
property being a hallmark of ownership.  The requirement that a
couple must demonstrate capacity and agreement to marry is
analogous to the requirement that an adverse possessor act
under a claim of right.  The capacity element requires that a
couple demonstrate that they are not legally barred from mar-
riage, for example, by a prior marriage or by age limitations.  The
agreement element requires that the couple demonstrate their in-
tent to be married.  Similarly, the claim of right element requires
that the adverse possessor demonstrate his or her capacity and
intent to claim title to the property.33
Just as adverse possession entails mimicking the legal formali-
29 Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married , 100
COLUM. L. REV. 957, 963 (2000).  Over half of the states recognized common-law
marriage in 1930. Id.  at 1011.  Today, only eleven states:  Alabama, Colorado,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Car-
olina, Texas, and the District of Columbia continue to recognize common-law mar-
riage. Id.  Some states have recognized marriage-like contractual obligations of
cohabitating couples. See, e.g. , Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976) (holding
that cohabitating parties in nonmarital relationships have rights to enforce express
contracts and assert equitable interests in property). One commentator argues that
“jurisdictions that claim to have abolished common-law marriage have, in fact, res-
urrected the doctrine under another name.”  Crawley, supra  note 28, at 400. R
30 Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law
Marriage,  75 OR. L. REV. 709, 712 (1996).
31 Dubler, supra note 29, at 970-71.
32 One dissimilarity between the two doctrines is the statutory time period for
adverse possession.  By contrast, “no specific period of cohabitation is required” for
common-law marriage.  Bowman, supra note 30, at 713.  New Hampshire is an ex- R
ception, where there is a three-year cohabitation requirement.  N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
457:39 (2004).
33 See supra  note 15. R
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ties of property ownership, acting like a married couple entails
mimicking the legal formalities of marriage.  The case In re Estate
of Wagner  is a modern example of a common law marriage.34  In
that case, the couple cohabitated but were not formally mar-
ried.35  When the “husband” died intestate, the “wife” filed an
application claiming an interest in his estate as a spouse at com-
mon law.36  Idaho law requires “mutual assumption of marital
rights, duties, and obligations” as an element of common law
marriage.37  As in the Ewing  adverse possession case, taxes were
of particular significance.38  The court was persuaded that no
common law marriage existed by the fact that the couple filed
separate tax returns, even though there might have been tax ben-
efits to filing a joint return.39  The court was also persuaded by
the facts that the woman did not change her employment records
to reflect her status as married, and the couple did not commin-
gle their funds in a joint bank account and did not refer to one
another as husband and wife.40
Just as adverse possession must be consistent and continuous,
the relationship must be consistent and continuous to prove com-
mon law marriage.41  In the case In re Estate of Marden , the
court held that “long and continuous cohabitation” was required
to give rise to a presumption of common law marriage.42  The
court found a lack of continuity in the relationship because,
among other things, DuPuy maintained a private apartment in
New York City and a separate social existence in the “cafe soci-
ety” of New York City, apart from her home with Marden in
34 893 P.2d 211 (Idaho 1995).
35 Id.  at 213.
36 Id.
37 Id.  at 214.
38 In addition to tax returns and employment records, courts are persuaded by
other evidence that the couple held itself out as married on legal instruments such as
deeds to property and medical records, see, e.g. , Coleman v. Graves, 122 N.W.2d 853
(Iowa 1963); and insurance records, see, e.g. , Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 645
P.2d 356 (Idaho 1982).
39 893 P.2d at 215.
40 Id.
41 See  Hampton v. Alabama, 69 So. 2d 727 (Ala. Ct. App. 1953) (continuous co-
habitation raises a presumption of common-law marriage); Melton v. Texas, 158
S.W. 550 (Tex. Crim. App. 1913) (common-law marriage requires continuous living
together as husband and wife); 1 WHARTON, LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 84, (2d ed. 1879)
(“The fact of cohabitation as man and wife raises a presumption of a legal marriage;
and this is particularly so after a long interval of time.  But such cohabitation must
be continuous and consistent to sustain the presumption.”).
42 355 So. 2d 121, 126 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
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Florida.43  The court interpreted Marden and DuPuy’s romantic
liaisons with other men and women as evidence that the relation-
ship was insufficiently consistent to be marital, pointing to the
“undisputed fact” that Ben Marden was “an inveterate philan-
derer,” and that DuPuy “was seen and escorted by male escorts
other than Ben.”44  The court interpreted the parties’ “nebulous
attitude toward the basic customs of marriage” as evidence of no
common law marriage.45
Ariela Dubler has noted that the requirement that a couple
hold themselves out as husband and wife is akin to the notoriety
requirement of adverse possession law.46  Dubler provides an il-
luminating analysis of the court documents and contemporary
media accounts of the 1930s case of Abraham Erlanger and
Charlotte Fixel-Erlanger.  To prove that the couple acted as if
married, Fixel-Erlanger’s attorney enlisted a parade of witnesses
who had encountered the couple to testify to her wifely devo-
tion.47  Erlanger’s servants testified that they and Mr. Erlanger
addressed Charlotte Fixel-Erlanger as “Mrs. Erlanger.”48  Doc-
tors, nurses, and hospital employees testified to how Fixel-
Erlanger cared for Erlanger while he was sick.49  Equating
wifehood with “a particular type of agile consumerism,” Fixel-
Erlanger’s attorney emphasized: “every department store in New
York has charge accounts in the name of Mrs. Erlanger.”50
Mr. Erlanger’s lack of objection to Mrs. Erlanger’s wifely be-
havior was legally significant because, as in adverse possession,
Mrs. Erlanger’s public conduct put him on notice of an imputed
marriage.51  Public opinion was important here.  To “gain public
recognition as Erlanger’s wife,” Fixel-Erlanger “needed a recep-
tive audience to perceive and comprehend her displays of wifely
behavior.”52  Therefore, her attorney based his case upon the tes-
timony of numerous third parties who understood Mr. and Mrs.
43 Id.  at 123.
44 Id.
45 Id.  at 126.
46 Dubler, supra  note 29, at 988 n.139.  Dubler attributes this insight to Carol
Rose. Id.
47 Id.  at 982-83.
48 Id.  at 983.
49 Id.  at 985.
50 Id.  at 986.
51 Id.  at 988.
52 Id.  at 987.
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Erlanger to be married.53  In the end, the court issued a highly
detailed opinion concluding that the relationship was “a blending
of two lives which both in the seclusion of the domestic circle and
in all their external and public aspects were such as are lived by
the average husband and wife faithfully devoted to each other.”54
2. Rationales for Common law Marriage
What are the rationales behind common law marriage?55  Why
must a common law husband and wife hold themselves out as
married and be accepted by the community?
As in adverse possession law, where the law protects the reli-
ance interests of the undisturbed trespasser, the doctrine of com-
mon law marriage protects the reliance interests of cohabitating
spouses.  During the heyday of the doctrine in the nineteenth
century, common law marriage was premised on the idea that
“law should protect innocent women from the whims and con-
trivances of irresponsible or rakish men.”56  Many cases involved
women who relied on men’s assurances that “‘we were just as
much married as if we had been married before a priest or a min-
ister.’”57  These women acted with the beliefs that upon the
death of their putative spouses or dissolution of the relationship,
they would be entitled to all the rights of wives, including inheri-
tance, divorce remedies, social security, and other government
benefits.  Implicit in this view is the idea of marriage as a contract
under which men provide for women economically.  As consider-
ation, women perform economic services in the private realm,
such as childcare and housework, or provide emotional care or
sex to their husbands.  But just as there is no good-faith standard
for the adverse possessor, there is no good-faith standard for the
common law marriage.  The cases do not delve deeply into
whether or not common law spouses had the subjective intent to
53 Id.
54 Id.  at 993-94.
55 Bowman argues that historical evidence is lacking for the often-cited theory
that common-law marriage was necessary in early frontier America where couples
lacked access to clergy and legal institutions to secure solemnization of their vows.
Bowman, supra  note 30, at 723 (“Common law marriage was valid in New York R
City, for example, but never in Wyoming.”).
56 Dubler, supra  note 29, at 964.
57 Bowman, supra  note 30, at 757 (quoting Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423, 434 R
(1907)).
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be married.58
Common law marriage statutes may also be explained by pub-
lic and third-party interests.  Just as adverse possession law
serves the public interest in a clear system of land titles, common
law marriage serves the public interest in the institution of mar-
riage.  Dubler explains how the doctrine of common law mar-
riage affirms marriage as an institution:
The doctrine allowed judges to efface the potentially threaten-
ing nature of nonmarital domestic relationships by labeling
them marriages.  Common law marriage thus transformed po-
tentially subversive relationships— subversive in their disre-
gard for the social and legal institution of marriage—into
completely traditional relationships.  In recognizing common
law marriages, therefore, courts reinforced the supremacy of
the institution of marriage by demonstrating that it could sub-
sume under its aegis almost all long-term domestic forms of
ordering.59
Thus, common law marriage is a method of subduing the
threat to the social order posed by nonmarital cohabitation.
Common law marriage also serves the public interest in priva-
tizing female economic dependency.60  By making men (or their
estates) liable to women for economic support, common law
marriage “shielded the public fisc” from the claims of poor wo-
men.61  However, as women’s roles became more independent
through the twentieth century, the state “shift[ed] from private to
public solutions to female dependence.”62  These shifts also ex-
plain the move to abolish common law marriage.
Common law marriage also protects the reliance interests of
third parties, for example, a hospital that relies on the represen-
tations of a common law wife that she can make medical deci-
sions regarding an incapacitated husband, or an insurance
company that presumes a common law husband is the beneficiary
of his wife’s policy, or a property owner who contracts with a
married couple to purchase a home.  Common law marriage af-
firms the public perception that a couple is married and alleviates
any potential concerns that a relationship is illegitimate.  Assum-
ing that a hallmark of the marriage relationship is monogamy,
58 Ariela R. Dubler, Note, Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage
in the Nineteenth Century , 107 YALE L.J. 1885, 1895-96 (1998).
59 Dubler, supra  note 29, at 969 (citation omitted).
60 Dubler, supra  note 58, at 1886-87. R
61 Dubler, supra  note 29, at 969. See also  Bowman, supra  note 30. R
62 Dubler, supra  note 29, at 998.
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recognizing common law marriage facilitates the public interest
in clarity about who is unavailable for coupling.  The interests of
children, as third parties, are also protected, in particular their
interests in not being branded “illegitimate.”63  Courts applied a
strong presumption in favor of common law marriage in order to
protect children from the stigma of illegitimacy.64
Just as courts may be loathe to award title to the bad-faith ad-
verse possessor, the law is loathe to reward women for “fraudu-
lent performances” as wives.65  Dubler contends that the reason
for the abolition of common law marriage in many jurisdictions
was a shift in the backstory from a “vision of an innocent femi-
ninity vulnerable to scheming men” to “a vision of a dangerous
femininity, of conniving and gold digging women preying on the
goodwill of innocent men (or their estates) through false per-
formances of wifely conduct.”66  The “gold digger” does not ful-
fill her end of the marriage contract: due to class privilege she
does not have to worry about childcare or housework.  She does
not provide genuine authentic emotional support for her hus-
band.  She may provide her husband with sexual access, but this
relationship more resembles prostitution than marriage.  Hence,
courts in common law marriage cases are careful to distinguish
the cohabitation element of a common law marriage from sexual
activity.67
Marriage here is performance: scripted wifely and husbandly
behavior held out to the public and accepted as legitimate.  Anxi-
ety over this concept of marriage was one reason for the move to
abolish the doctrine.  Dubler explains the view of marriage as not
only a contract, but a status :
Marriage, they contended, was not merely a private relation
between a man and a woman.  It exemplified a private relation
in which the state and society had a legitimate public interest.
As the United States Supreme Court opined, marriage “is an
63 Id.  at 971.
64 Id. at 972; In re Megginson’s Estate, 28 P. 388, 389 (Or. 1891) (“[W]here the
legitimacy of children is called in question, both upon authority and general princi-
ples of public policy and natural equity, every reasonable presumption is indulged in
favor of leg itimacy.”).
65 See supra  note 15. R
66 Dubler, supra  note 29, at 964.
67 See, e.g. , Beck v. Beck, 246 So. 2d 420, 428 (Ala. 1971) (“Cohabitation is not a
mere gratification of sexual passion, or casual commerce between man and woman,
and no presumption can elevate concubinage of whatever duration to the dignity of
marriage.”).
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institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public
is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and
of society, without which there would be neither civilization
nor progress.”68
Proponents of abolition also claimed that courts “could not ac-
curately distinguish between marital and meretricious relation-
ships.”69  By exposing marriage as “nothing more than a series of
performances,” common law marriage destabilized an institution
thought to be “at the center of the social order.”70
3. Functional Parenthood: Acting like Mothers and Fathers
The American Law Institute’s (ALI) Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution is the first attempt by the ALI to codify fam-
ily law into a Restatement-like volume.71  The ALI Principles are
a departure from traditional custody law in that they recognize
the custody rights of persons other than biological or adoptive
parents.72  Oregon’s statute defining a child-parent relationship
provides an example of the concept of “functional parenthood”:
[A] ‘child-parent relationship’ . . . [is one] in which . . . a per-
son having physical custody of a child or residing in the same
household as the child supplied, or otherwise made available
to the child, food, clothing, shelter and incidental necessaries
and provided the child with necessary care, education and dis-
cipline, and which relationship continued on a day-to-day ba-
sis, through interaction, companionship, interplay and
mutuality, that fulfilled the child’s psychological needs for a
parent as well as the child’s physical needs.73
68 Dubler, supra  note 29, at 971-72 (quoting Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211
(1888)).
69 Id.  at 972.
70 Id.  at 1008.
71 AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03 (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].  The
ALI Principles differ from a Restatement in that they give more weight to “emerg-
ing legal concepts.”  GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., FOREWORD TO PRINCIPLES OF THE
LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS & RECOMMENDATIONS (Proposed Final
Draft, pt. I Feb. 14, 1997), at xiii (“Given the current disarray in family law—the
unparalleled volume of litigation and legislation—this approach seems more
appropriate.”).
72 See, e.g. , Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (holding that “natural”
parents have a right to “care, custody and management of their children”).
73 OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(10)(a) (2003).  Oregon courts have discretion under
a preponderance of the evidence test to determine the appropriateness of granting
custody. Id.  § 109.119(3)(a).  One commentator notes that “similar statutory au-
thority is rare across the American legal landscape.”  James Herbie DiFonzo, To-
ward a Unified Field Theory of the Family: The American Law Institute’s Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution,  2001 BYU L. REV. 923, 933 (2001).
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The ALI Principles describe three types of parents: legal par-
ents, as defined by current state law; parents by estoppel; and de
facto parents.  A parent by estoppel is one who held him or her-
self out as an official parent with the agreement of the legal par-
ent.74  A de facto parent is one who accepted parental
responsibilities because of the failure or incapacity of legal par-
ents.75  Both parents by estoppel and de facto parents are types
of “functional parents.”  They must demonstrate that they lived
with the child and accepted parental responsibilities.
Although the legal requirements of functional parenthood are
not as widely agreed upon as the other two doctrines, they mirror
those of adverse possession and common law marriage in many
ways.76  To be a functional parent, one must act like a parent.77
For example, to qualify as a parent by estoppel under the ALI
Principles, a father may prove that he had a good-faith belief that
he was the biological father and “fully accepted parental respon-
sibilities consistent with that belief.”78  The ALI Principles define
acting like a parent as caretaking: providing for the child’s
needs.79  To qualify as a de facto parent, a person must demon-
strate that he or she at least “regularly performed a share of care-
taking functions at least as great as that of the parent with whom
the child primarily lived.”80  The ALI provides an extensive list
of caretaking functions, such as ensuring the health, safety, edu-
cation, and development of the child.81  The ALI defines a
broader category of parenting functions as caretaking plus pro-
74 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, § 2.03(1)(b). R
75 Id.  § 2.03(1)(c).  The de facto parent concept is akin to the doctrine of in loco
parentis , which “creates parental rights and responsibilities in one who voluntarily
provides support or takes over custodial duties.”  Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child
Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in
Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families,  78 GEO. L.J. 459, 502 (1990).
76 Gregory Loken has drawn the parallel:  “Can parental rights—and, by implica-
tion, children—be acquired by adverse possession?”  Gregory A. Loken, The New
‘Extended Family’—‘De Facto’ Parenthood and Standing Under Chapter 2 , 2001
BYU L. REV. 1045, 1045 (2001).
77 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, § 2.03.  Wisconsin has a similar statute.  Wis. R
Stat. Ann. § 767.245(1) (West 2001).  Wisconsin courts have established a test very
similar to the elements of the ALI Principles. See  Holtzman v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d
419, 435-36 (Wis. 1995).  One Massachusetts court has cited the ALI Principles in
establishing its own definition of de facto parent.  E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886,
891 (Mass. 1999).
78 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, § 2.03(1)(b)(ii).
79 Id.  § 2.03(5).
80 Id.  § 2.03(1)(c)(ii)(B).
81 Id.  § 2.03(5).
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viding economic support for the household and participating in
decisions about the child’s welfare.82  Legal formalities also de-
fine functional parents.  Any person upon whom child support
obligations are imposed automatically qualifies as a parent by
estoppel.83
Just as adverse possessors and common law spouses must be-
have in a manner that is consistent and continuous, functional
parents must demonstrate that they acted as parents in a pro-
longed and unwavering manner.  Generally, the ALI requires
that parents by estoppel and de facto parents live with the child
for at least two years.84  The ALI uses descriptors such as “regu-
larly performed” and “accepting full and permanent responsibili-
ties” to define functional parents.85  The requirement that a
functional parent live with the child parallels the physical prox-
imity requirements of cohabitation in common law marriage and
the element of actual entry in adverse possession.86
Additionally, functional parents must behave in a way that is
open and notorious.  They must hold themselves out as actual
parents, much like adverse possessors must hold themselves out
as property owners.  Parents by estoppel include individuals who
lived with the child, “holding out and accepting full and perma-
nent responsibilities as parent[s].”87  When functional parents
hold themselves out as legal parents, they put other potential
parents on notice that they should object.88  For example, in the
Supreme Court case Quilloin v. Walcott , the biological father,
82 Id.  § 2.03(6).
83 Id.
84 Id.  § 2.03(1)(b)-(c).
85 Id.
86 But see  Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
(awarding visitation rights to a mother who did not live with the child but spoke with
him daily, spoke with his biological mother daily, saw the child twice a week, and
made parenting decisions about the child); Polikoff, supra note 75, at 522-23 (citing
In re  Adoption of A.O.L., No. 1JU-85-25 P/A (Alaska Super. Ct. July 23, 1985)
(granting an adoption to a parent who did not live with the child)).
87 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, § 2.03(1)(b)(iii).  Interestingly, what distin- R
guishes a parent by estoppel from a de facto parent is that de facto parents need not
hold themselves out as parents.
88 A child’s legal parents must be provided with official notice and an opportunity
to appear at any legal custody hearing. Id.  § 2.04 cmt. a.  The ALI explains, “The
requirement of notice and the opportunity to participate applies even in cases in
which a parent has had little or no contact with the child.” Id.  § 2.04 cmt. c.  The
ALI also requires that notice be given to legal parents, parents by estoppel, and de
facto parents who have continuously resided with the child for the past six months.
Id.  § 2.04(1).  De facto parents who have not continuously resided with the child
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Quilloin, contested an adoption of the child by the husband of
the biological mother.89  The adoptive family had lived together
for eight years prior to filing for legal custody.90  The Court held
for the adoptive family, reasoning that Quilloin’s failure to act
according to social expectations for parents barred his claim.91
Quilloin “did not petition for legitimation of his child at any time
during the [eleven] years between the child’s birth and the filing
of Randall Walcott’s adoption petition,”92 and he “[did] not com-
plain of his exemption from [paternal] responsibilities and, in-
deed, he does not even now seek custody of his child.”93
4. Rationales for Functional Parenthood
What are the rationales behind the doctrine of functional
parenthood?  The reliance interests of functional parents are at
play.  But courts also protect the interests of legal parents who
relied on guarantees of functional parents to provide child sup-
port.  Equitable estoppel in the context of child custody requires
“(1) action or nonaction which induces (2) reliance by another
(3) to his detriment.”94  In the case Karin T. v. Michael T. , the
court imposed child support obligations on a transgendered do-
mestic partner who had consented to the artificial insemination
of his partner.95  The court reasoned that the wife had acted in
reliance on her husband’s implicit promise to support the child:
“There is nothing in the record to indicate that the wife would
have undergone artificial insemination in the absence of the hus-
band’s consent.”96  The doctrine is also used to protect the reli-
ance interests of functional parents in child custody cases.  In
Atkinson v. Atkinson , the court granted visitation rights to a
nonbiological father who had developed a parental relationship
with the child in reliance on the mother’s guarantee that he was a
may still have standing if “the individual has attempted to exercise a parenting role
but has been prevented by the parent from doing so.” Id.  § 2.04 cmt. d.
89 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
90 Id.  at 247.
91 Id.  at 253.
92 Id.  at 249.
93 Id.  at 256.
94 In re  Paternity of D.L.H., 419 N.W.2d 283, 287 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987).
95 484 N.Y.S.2d 780 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985). See also  Wener v. Wener, 312 N.Y.S.2d
815 (N.Y. App. Div. 1970) (requiring a former husband to pay child support for a
child he had agreed to adopt with the plaintiff, even though no formal adoption
occurred); Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (imposing child sup-
port obligations on husband who had consented to wife’s artificial insemination).
96 484 N.Y.S.2d at 783.
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legitimate parent.97  Similarly, in the New York case Jean Maby
H. v. Joseph H. , the court held that a mother was estopped from
denying her husband’s right to seek custody because she had held
him out as the child’s father and he had accepted the role.98
The ALI Principles are also concerned with the societal inter-
est in parenting as a public good.  The drafters make explicit
mention of their concern with balancing society’s interest in
parenting  against the legal interests of parents .99  The ALI Prin-
ciples “aim at resolving the tension between society’s allocation
of full legal recognition to traditional parents and the dawning
reality that disallowing the interests of functional parents ‘ig-
nores child-parent relationships that may be fundamental to the
child’s sense of security and stability.’”100
Furthermore, the concept of functional parenthood protects
third-party expectations and interests.  Caretaking functions in-
clude many interactions with third parties, including “communi-
cating with teachers and counselors,” “arranging for health-care
providers,” and “arranging alternative care by a family member,
babysitter, or other child-care provider or facility.”101  Those
third parties rely on a parent’s representations that she is the
child’s legitimate caretaker, with the authority to make decisions
regarding the child’s welfare.
Just like the figures of the bad-faith adverse possessor and the
gold-digging common law wife, the specter of the kidnapper
looms over the theory of functional parenthood.  Despite the
structural similarity of functional parenthood and adverse pos-
session, courts resist the analogy.  In the Maryland case Mont-
gomery County Department of Social Services v. Sanders , the
court granted custody to the biological mother after the child’s
temporary stay with a foster family.102  The court held:
97 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).  The husband was also required to
pay child support. Id.
98 676 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998).
99 The classic dilemma of modern custody law is generally phrased as the conflict
between the legal interests of biological parents and the best interests of the child.
The best-interests-of-the-child standard is a proxy for the state’s interest in ensuring
the care of children.  As Justice Cardozo stated:  “The chancellor . . . does not pro-
ceed upon the theory that the . . . father or mother, has a cause of action against the
other or indeed against any one.  He acts as parens patriae to do what is best for the
interest of the child.”  Finley v. Finley, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925).
100 DiFonzo, supra  note 73, at 938. R
101 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, § 2.03(5). R
102 381 A.2d 1154 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1977).
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To allow a person to abscond with a child and then judicially
condone the action after a pre-established time period has
lapsed is to place a premium on disobedience of court orders
and simultaneously to reduce the child to “personal property”
to which any person can acquire some sort of “squatter’s
rights.”103
Resistance to the analogy to property law in part stems from
commodification anxiety: the fear that excessive commodifica-
tion will “threaten human flourishing” and “sull[y]” human rela-
tionships.104  But courts seem more concerned with the idea of
adverse possession of children as a sort of legalized kidnapping.
The Sanders  opinion seeks to avoid a doctrine that would create
incentives for functional parents to abscond with children and re-
sult in the absurd hypothetical in which criminals gained custody
of a child by stealing him and keeping him safe for an extended
period of time.105
The idea of parenthood that underlies the concept is not a par-
ent as a biological relation to a child, but rather a parent as a
caretaker.  One commentator remarked that the ALI Principles
reflect that “[p]arenthood is in the process of discarding its bio-
logical chrysalis and emerging in a more functional form.”106  The
commentator predicted that “[h]owever sinuous the path of the
law, its direction seems relatively clear: we are in a transitional
stage along the continuum from sanctioning only biologically
based families to legally recognizing functional families.”107
Functional parenthood inspires anxiety because it threatens to
detract from the special legal treatment of “natural” parents.
103 Id.  at 1164. See also  Bennet v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 285 n.2. (N.Y. 1976)
(rejecting “the notion, if that it be, that third-party custodians may acquire some sort
of squatter’s rights in another’s child”).  Nonetheless, the final result in the case was
to grant custody rights to the functional parent.  Bennett v. Marrow, 59 A.D.2d 492,
493 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977) (holding that “the interests of the child in custody cases
are paramount and in no way subservient to the cold legal right of a parent”).
104 JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:  WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT
AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 118 (2000).  Williams argues that “commodification
anxiety serves to police traditional gender boundaries, as when the fear of a world
sullied by commodification of intimate relationships feeds opposition to granting
wives entitlements based on household work.” Id .; see also  May v. Anderson, 345
U.S. 528, 533 (1953) (arguing that child rearing constitutes a right “far more precious
. . . than property rights”); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability , 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1849, 1927 (1987) (“Conceiving of any child in market rhetoric wrongs
personhood.”).
105 381 A.2d at 1164.
106 DiFonzo, supra  note 73, at 925. R
107 Id.  at 936.
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One commentator fears that the ALI idea of de facto parenthood
will lead to “parent inflation” and “sow uncertainty and fluidity
about the meaning of parenthood.”108  At the same time, the
ALI Principles attempt to strengthen the idea of parenthood by
bringing within their ambit many relationships between adults
and children that have previously been considered non-legal.
5. Family Law Doctrines of Performance Reification as
Analogues to Adverse Possession
Striking similarities emerge from examination of the legal ele-
ments of adverse possession, common law marriage, and func-
tional parenthood.  The legal doctrine in each of these cases
rewards the claimant who behaves privately as an owner, spouse,
or parent.  Courts and legislatures define the core private behav-
ior that is constitutive of status as a close relationship of physical
proximity: for adverse possession, it is actual entry onto the prop-
erty; for common law marriage and functional parenthood, it is
cohabitation with the spouse or child.  However, this behavior
cannot be a mere private domestic ordering.  It is crucial that the
claimant hold him or herself out to the public as an owner,
spouse, or parent, and that the relationship be unchallenged over
a period of time.  Nor can the behavior be an isolated or sporadic
occurrence: in all three cases it must be consistent and continu-
ous.  Courts often find it dispositive that the claimant mimicked
the legal formalities of ownership, marriage, and parenthood, ex-
amining tax returns, employment records, and contracts with
third parties.  The interests protected in each of the three cases
are those of the private parties (titular owner versus adverse pos-
sessor, common law husband versus common law wife, biological
parent versus functional parent), the interests of the legal system
in ensuring the stability and administrability of property, mar-
riage, and custody law, and the interests of third parties who re-
lied on the appearance of legitimacy.
These doctrines expose underlying conceptual difficulties for
the institutions of property, marriage, and parenthood.  The con-
fusion can be charted as follows:
108 David M. Wagner, Balancing “Parents Are” and “Parents Do” in the Supreme
Court’s Constitutionalized Family Law:  Some Implications for the ALI Proposals on
De Facto Parenthood , 2001 BYU L. REV. 1175, 1184 (2001).
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FIGURE 1
Property Marriage Parenthood
Private Status Owner Husband/Wife Biological
Parent
Public Possession/ Cohabitation/ Caretaking/
Performance Trespassing Prostitution Kidnapping
Legal Formality Title Marriage Legal
License and Adoption,
Ceremonial Custody, or
Solemnization Guardianship
When private status and public performance line up, the law is
highly likely to enforce the rights and duties of the claimant, even
without the right “paperwork” (i.e., the legal formality).  When
private status or public performance is in doubt, the situation
gets more dicey.  Adverse possession, common law marriage, and
functional parenthood are cases in which a public performance is
rewarded with all the benefits of legal formality, even though pri-
vate status may be “inauthentic.”  However, the adverse posses-
sor is only rewarded when she pays taxes, mimicking legal
formalities, and calls herself “owner,” mimicking the idea of
property as status.  The core interests protected here must there-
fore relate to administration of bureaucratic institutions.
C. Identity Determination
In the law of adverse possession, common law marriage, and
functional parenthood, acting as if  may imbue the actor with le-
gal status.  An interesting point of comparison is a body of legal
concepts that I will refer to as the law of “identity determina-
tion”:  the doctrinal framework used by courts to determine
whether a particular group status, such as racial or sexual iden-
tity, should be attributed to an individual for purposes of legal
recognition.  Historically, the issue of race determination arose in
the legal context of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century institu-
tions of slavery and segregation.109  The issue of sex determina-
109 The issue also arises in contemporary debates over the meaning of racial cate-
gorizations.  For example, difficulties have been noted in identifying the proper re-
cipients of race-based remedial programs, such as affirmative action. See, e.g. ,
Luther Wright, Jr., Note, Who’s Black, Who’s White, and Who Cares: Reconceptual-
izing the United States’s Definition of Race and Racial Classifications , 48 VAND. L.
REV. 513, 515-16 (1995) (describing cases of affirmative action “fraud” in which per-
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tion has arisen in legal contexts such as marriage, legal
documents, sumptuary laws prohibiting cross-dressing, and an-
tidiscrimination.  This Article will examine these case studies in
identity determination.110
In the law of race determination, parallels to adverse posses-
sion are apparent.  Cases on race determination reveal that juries
have rewarded claimants who behaved privately as if  they were
white.111  In the context of sex determination, courts prove un-
willing to recognize gender performance as evidence of sex.
Rather, decisions hinge on biological understandings of sex.
1. Race Determination: Acting like a White Man or Woman
The institutions of slavery and segregation required that all in-
dividuals fall on one side of the color line, clearly dividing mem-
bers of the dominant and subordinate racial classes for purposes
of division of labor, social association, and political participation.
For those individuals whose race was not overdetermined by skin
color, social standing, and ancestry, litigation was necessary in
order to determine if they were entitled to the rights and privi-
leges afforded white persons.112  Trials in which a determination
of a person’s racial identity was the central issue were typical in
nineteenth-century Southern courts.113  These trials involved is-
sues including “wills, marriage and divorce, transportation, immi-
sons claimed minority status in order to secure jobs); Christopher A. Ford, Adminis-
tering Identity: The Determination of “Race” in Race-Conscious Law , 82 CAL. L.
REV. 1231 (1994) (discussing quandaries of “benign” race-based classification).
110 Due to the volume, scope, and depth of case law and scholarship on the issues
of race and sex determination, this Article focuses narrowly on specific case studies
in order to best highlight points of comparison with other doctrines of performance
reification.  I make no claim that every legal doctrine regarding categorizations of
identity is analogous to the doctrine of adverse possession.
111 In focusing on a particular subset of cases and scholarship on race determina-
tion, I do not intend to reduce discussion of race to a black/white dichotomy or to
marginalize the experiences of non-black peoples of color.  I merely intend to limit
the scope of my investigation so as to meaningfully examine a distinct legal doctrine.
Additionally, by using the terms “black” and “white” in lieu of other signifiers, I
intend to refer to historical labels, not to accurately describe any particular group or
individual.
112 Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the
Nineteenth-Century South , 108 YALE L.J. 109, 122 (1998). See also Robert Westley,
First-Time Encounters: “Passing” Revisited and Demystification as a Critical Prac-
tice , 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 297, 300-01 (2000) (examining “the visually overde-
termined racial situation of Black Americans in law and society” and the
phenomenon of “passing” as a sort of “group identity trespass”).
113 Gross, supra  note 112, at 111. R
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gration and naturalization, and libel and slander.”114
Two scholars have undertaken particularly illuminating exami-
nations of the types of evidence and factors considered by courts
in making race determinations.  Ariela Gross thoroughly ana-
lyzes sixty-eight cases of racial determination appealed to state
supreme courts in the nineteenth-century South.115  Daniel
Sharfstein analyzes the law of race determination in the post-Re-
construction South.116  Both Gross and Sharfstein conclude that
the cases demonstrate that the meaning of race, and the proper
mode of making race determinations, were understood as highly
contested matters to Southerners.117
Although the “elements” of a claim of whiteness cannot be de-
scribed with the precision of the elements of adverse possession,
the types of evidence analyzed by Southern courts in making ra-
cial determinations provide a rough outline of a doctrine.  Courts
examined not only the claimants’ physical appearances and an-
cestry, but also where the claimants lived, worked and socialized,
whether they acted according to community expectations for
white men and women, whether they held themselves out in their
communities as white on a consistent and continuous basis, and
whether or not they were recognized by those communities as
white.118
Participants in these cases were attuned to the spaces occupied
by claimants as evidence of race: in particular, churches and
schools.119  For example, in the case of Abby Guy, who sued for
freedom from slavery for herself and her four children, witnesses
testified to such matters as whether Guy “visited among white
folks, and went to church, parties, etc.”120  Guy’s daughter
114 Daniel J. Sharfstein, The Secret History of Race in the United States , 112 YALE
L.J. 1473, 1475 (2003).
115 Gross, supra  note 112, at 120. R
116 Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1475-76. R
117 Gross, supra  note 112, at 111-12; Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1476. R
118 Gross, supra  note 112, at 130. R
119 Id.  at 151 (“[W]itnesses remembered whether the person at issue had inhab-
ited churches, schools, and other spaces that were designated white or black.”); see
also  Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1484 (noting that witnesses testified to “attend- R
ance at white schools and churches” as evidence of whiteness).
120 Gross, supra  note 112, at 133 (quoting Transcript of Trial, Daniel v. Guy, No. R
4109, at 20 (bill of exceptions) (Ark. Ashley County Cir. Ct. July 1855) (collection of
Pulaski County Law Library, Little Rock, Ark., Ark. Supreme Court Records &
Briefs), rev’d in part , 19 Ark. 121, 1857 WL 545  (Ark. 1857), aff’d after remand , 23
Ark. 50, 1861 WL 538 (Ark. 1861)).  Gross describes and analyzes the case of Daniel
v. Guy  in great detail.  Gross, supra  note 112. R
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-2\ORE205.txt unknown Seq: 25 18-NOV-05 13:17
Adverse Possession of Identity 587
“boarded out” so as to attend a white school.121
In determining whether a claimant was white, courts consid-
ered whether the claimant “held himself out as white and was
accepted as white.”122  Evidence of a claimant’s performance and
reputation were so strongly considered that they were sufficient
to trump contrary evidence of “negro ancestry.”123  Indeed,
judges in these cases “repeatedly held that the determination of
an individual’s race was ‘a question very proper for a jury,’ be-
cause the jury represented the sense of the community.”124
Holding oneself out as white meant a particular sort of public
performance: assimilating into white society, and taking on the
legal rights and duties of white people.125  Juries considered such
performances to be evidence of white “blood.”126
In the case of Abby Guy, “lay witnesses focused on her social
identity, her associations with white people, and her having per-
formed tasks that white people quintessentially performed.”127
Such evidence was commonly considered in these cases.  In the
slander case Spencer v. Looney , George Spencer sued George
Looney for spreading the rumor that Spencer and his family were
“nothing but God damned negroes,” resulting in the expulsion of
Spencer’s child from school.128  The jury held for Spencer, in
large part because the evidence demonstrated that he had lived
as an accepted member of the white community for more than
fifty years.129
In both the cases of Abby Guy and George Spencer, courts
held that the claimant was white because the claimant had lived
continuously under a claim of whiteness for many years without
121 Daniel v. Guy, 1857 WL, at *2.
122 Gross, supra  note 112, at 166. R
123 Id.  at 164; see also  State v. Cantey, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 614, 614 (S.C. Ct. App.
1835); Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1484-85. R
124 Gross, supra  note 112, at 126 (quoting State v. Davis, 18 S.C.L. (2 Bail.) 558, R
560 (S.C. Ct. App. 1831)).
125 Gross, supra note 112, at 163.
126 Id.
127 Id.  at 133; see also id.  at 150-51 (“Acceptance in the white community could
signify white identity, and certain kinds of associations with ‘colored’ people almost
certainly meant blackness.”)
128 Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1474 (quoting Appellee’s Brief at 5-9, Spencer v. R
Looney, 82 S.E. 745 (Va. 1914)).  Sharfstein discusses Spencer v. Looney  in depth.
Sharfstein, supra  note 114. R
129 Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1497. R
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challenge from the community.130  In the South Carolina case,
State v. Cantey,  the judge was required to determine whether or
not sixteen men of ambiguous racial ancestry qualified as wit-
nesses.131  The judge noted that the men were “respectable . . .
one of them is a militia officer, and their caste has never been
questioned until now.”132  Thus, the judge protected settled ex-
pectations, arguing that the challenge to the one claimants’ racial
status was belated.  The community was put on notice by, among
other things, the claimant’s militia service, and its failure to ob-
ject within a reasonable period of time weighed heavily for the
claimants.
Southern juries relied heavily on evidence of whether or not
claimants acted out the legal formalities of whiteness.  For men,
this meant exercising the rights and privileges of whiteness, and
for women, this meant acting out the “civic duties” of “pure
white womanhood.”133  Witnesses very often mentioned voting,
mustering in the militia, testifying in court, jury service, holding
property and forming contracts as the types of activities that
demonstrated whiteness.134  In many cases, the claimant’s civic
participation was dispositive.135  The case of Bryan v. Walton ,
which turned on whether or not Joseph Nunez was white, is illus-
trative.136  At the end of the trial, there was conflicting testimony
on Nunez’s physical appearance, acceptance in the community,
behavior, character, and ancestry.137  However, there was agree-
130 Id. ; Gross, supra  note 112, at 136.  Abby Guy had lived as a free person for R
over a decade prior to her enslavement. Id.
131 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 614, 614 (S.C. Ct. App. 1835).  At the time, South Carolina
law provided that only white persons could testify against other white persons.
Thomas D. Morris, Slaves and the Rules of Evidence in Criminal Trials , 68 CHI.-
KENT. L. REV. 1209, 1209 (1993).
132 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) at 614 (finding claimants to be white because they had been
accepted by society and had exercised legal rights); see also  Gross, supra  note 112, R
at 164 (discussing State v. Cantey).
133 Gross, supra  note 112, at 157. R
134 Id.  at 113, 163, 166.
135 Id.  at 164 (“At the appellate level, when courts referred to performances of
whiteness, it was civic performances that they found determinative.”).
136 This case involved a dispute over the property rights of Joseph Nunez, who
died without heirs.  Prior to his death, Nunez had sold six slaves to Seaborn Bryan.
Hughes Walton, the administrator of Nunez’s estate, sued Bryan to recover the
slaves, on the theory that Nunez did not have the legal right to transfer the slaves
because he was not a white man himself. Id . at 158 (citing Transcript of Trial, Bryan
v. Walton, No. A-1154, (Ga. Houston County Super. Ct. 1859) (collection of Ga.
Dep’t of Archives & History, Atlanta, Ga., Supreme Court, Case F, Box 46)).
137 Gross, supra  note 112, at 161-62. R
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ment from almost all witnesses that Nunez “had not exercised
the privileges and rights of whiteness” such as voting and military
duty.138  The jury found that Nunez was not white.
2. Rationales for Performance Reification in Race
Determination
What is the rationale behind this doctrine of race determina-
tion, in which evidence of “white” performance and acceptance
in the white community were the criteria for determining white-
ness?  Such a rule is contrary to the standard of “hypodescent”:
the rule that race is an inherited, biological quality that descends
through generations.139  Application of this rule requires assign-
ment of a particular quantum of black “blood” to those of mixed
parentage or ancestry.  Southern states developed varying blood
quantum rules for determining race based on hypodescent.140  As
Cheryl Harris has noted, “In the commonly held popular view,
the presence of Black ‘blood’—including the infamous ‘one-
drop’—consigned a person to being ‘Black.’”141
Although, presumably, whiteness was a function of ancestry,
this factor was not controlling.142  Neither was biological science
determinative: out of the sixty-eight cases analyzed by Gross,
only nine appeared to rely on expert scientific testimony about
racial differences.143  In State v. Cantey , the court found a group
of witnesses to be white because they had been accepted by soci-
ety and had exercised legal rights, despite evidence of black an-
cestry.144  The judge held that “it may be well and proper, that a
man of worth, honesty, industry and respectability, should have
the rank of a white man, while a vagabond of the same degree of
138 Id.  at 162.
139 Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property , 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1738 & n.136
(1993) (“Case law that attempted to define race frequently struggled over the pre-
cise fractional amount of Black ‘blood’—traceable Black ancestry—that would de-
feat a claim to whiteness.”).
140 Id. at 1738.
141 Id.  at 1737.
142 Gross, supra  note 112, at 118 (“[M]ost of the testimony in court traveled far R
afield from questions of ancestry.”). But see  Harris, supra  note 140, at 1739-40 (con- R
cluding that determinations of “blood” or fractions of ancestry played a stronger
role than social acceptance or performance).
143 Gross, supra  note 112, at 153.  Gross concludes that the “precise fraction of
the ‘African blood’ in Abby Guy’s veins” was not determinative of the jury out-
come. Id.  at 137.
144 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 614, 614 (S.C. Ct. App. 1835).
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blood should be confined to the inferior caste.”145  Even though
there was evidence in Spencer v. Looney  that Looney had him-
self acknowledged having “Negro blood,” the jury nonetheless
found him to be white.146
Gross notes the similarity to “prescriptive” doctrines in which
“one might acquire a right to property after a prescribed number
of years by virtue of having used the property and treated it as
one’s own for those years without challenge.”147  Courts here im-
plicitly analogized whiteness to property148 and protected the
claimant’s reliance interests in whiteness as they would have
those of an adverse possessor.149  In State v. Cantey , the judge
held that it would be “very cruel and mischievous” to upset the
expectation of whiteness for a claimant “whose caste has never
been questioned until now . . . . Shall time and prescription,
which secure and consecrate all other rights, have no effect in
fixing the civil condition of an individual?”150
In addition to the reliance interests of particular claimants to
white status, the law was also at work protecting the reliance in-
terests of third parties.  Reliance interests of innumerable third
parties who had dealt with claimants as civic equals were at
stake—such as Seaborn Bryan, who had contracted with Joseph
Nunez under the assumption that he was a white man with the
capacity to contract.151  One decision applied a “reverse one-
drop rule” to prevent a white husband from annulling his mar-
riage on the grounds that he had discovered that his wife was
black—in part to protect the interests of the couples’ children by
preventing the man from securing an easy divorce.152
145 Id.
146 One of Spencer’s friends “testified that while ‘on a drunk’ together, Spencer
said that his family was ‘mixed blooded, he said he had Negro blood in him, but he
didn’t object as it made him hardy.’”  Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1497 (quoting R
Transcript of Trial at 113, Spencer v. Looney, 82 S.E. 745 (Va. 1912)) (on file with
Virginia State Law Library, Richmond, Va.) (testimony of Albert Stevenson).
147 Gross, supra  note 112, at 165.
148 Harris, supra  note 140 (describing whiteness as a property interest). R
149 Gross, supra  note 112, at 136. R
150 Cantey , 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) at 614-16.
151 See  Transcript of Trial, Bryan v. Walton, No. A-1154 (Ga. Houston County
Super. Ct. April 1853) (collection of Ga. Dep’t of Archives & History, Atlanta, Ga.,
Supreme Court, Case F., Box 17), rev’d , 14 Ga. 185 (1853).
152 Id.  at 1503 (citing Ferrall v. Ferrall, 69 S.E. 60, 62 (N.C. 1910) (Clark, C.J.,
concurring)).  The judge went so far as to suggest that the plaintiff should have
moved to another locality where his wife’s race was unknown, so as to shield his
family. Id.
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Additionally, the community’s interests in the administrability
of the institutions of slavery and segregation were at stake in
these cases.  Jim Crow era segregation required division of whites
and blacks in every shared public space: “from public transporta-
tion to public parks, from the workplace to hospitals, asylums,
and orphanages, from the homes for the aged, the blind, deaf,
and dumb, to the prisons, from saloons to churches . . . parks,
theaters, boarding houses, waiting rooms, toilets, and water
fountains.”153
To protect third-party interests in the institution of segregation
and “minimize resource-wasting conflict,” doctrines of race de-
termination needed to provide a claim clearing function, as in
adverse possession.154  Overzealous policing of the color line
threatened a large portion of white society that “had long in-
cluded numerous people of African descent.”155  Sharfstein ex-
plains, “[i]f no one’s racial status was secure without an
exhaustive genealogy, the governmental apparatus of segregation
and white supremacy would be perpetually threatening to
whites.”156  Thus, “[w]ith unique access to the South’s racial
secrets, courts often worked to discourage anyone who would ac-
tively unearth them.”157  Such decisions “kept a segregated soci-
ety’s wheels greased.”158
The doctrine also served a political role in maintaining segre-
gation.  In the trial of Abby Guy, a light-skinned woman, Guy’s
lawyers played on the community’s “fears of hidden essences by
telling a tale of white slavery.”159  The media used cases such as
Guy’s to “illustrate to their Northern readers the ultimate horror
of slaveholders’ evil: the possibility of white slavery.”160  By ap-
peasing these concerns, verdicts such as Guy’s had the paradoxi-
cal effect of making the institution of slavery more palatable to
Southern and Northern audiences.
The doctrine of race determination described here also created
anxiety by laying bare the fundamental dilemma of the
153 LEON F. LITWACK, TROUBLE IN MIND:  BLACK SOUTHERNERS IN THE AGE OF
JIM CROW 233, 246 (1998).
154 See  Rose, supra  note 2, at 81. R
155 Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1503. R
156 Id.  at 1476.
157 Id.  at 1499.
158 Id.  at 1476, 1507.
159 Gross, supra  note 112, at 127. R
160 Id.
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unknowability of race and the lack of basis for the institutions of
slavery and segregation.  The idea that a black person could suc-
cessfully pass for white also threatened white self-definition by
revealing the arbitrariness of racial identity.161  Just as the doc-
trine of adverse possession generated anxieties about thievery,
common law marriage generated anxieties about gold diggers,
and functional parenthood generated anxieties about kidnap-
ping, the doctrine of racial determination generated the fear that
persons with “negro blood” were “passing as white” and “mak-
ing fools of those who accepted them.”162
3. Sex Determination: Being a Man or a Woman
Based on the foregoing analysis, one might expect to see a doc-
trine of performance reification in the law of sex specification.
Hypothetically, one could imagine a doctrine determining sex
based on the following factors: whether the claimant behaved
privately as a man or a woman, whether the claimant occupied
certain gendered spaces (such as the men’s or women’s locker
room), whether the claimant held out a consistent gendered im-
age to the community on a continuous basis, whether or not the
community accepted that image, and whether or not the claimant
executed the legal formalities deemed appropriate to his or her
purported sex.  This doctrine would make sense because it would
protect most third parties who came to rely on a person’s
gendered self-presentation in everyday interaction.
However, no such pattern is apparent from the case law on
transgendered persons.163  Courts have been called upon to de-
termine the sex of such individuals in the context of laws defining
marriage as a union between a “man” and a “woman”; official
documents, such as birth certificates; eligibility for sporting
events; and the abilities of transgendered individuals to state
claims for sex discrimination.164  In these cases, courts assume
that biology overdetermines sex and disregard evidence of per-
161 Id.  at 129, 166.
162 Id.  at 129.
163 The term “transgendered people” refers broadly to individuals “whose appear-
ance, personal characteristics, or behaviors differ from stereotypes about how men
and women are ‘supposed’ to be.”  Jamison Green, Introduction to Transgender Is-
sues , in THE POL’Y INSTITUTE OF THE NAT’L GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE &
NAT’L CTR. FOR LESBIAN RIGHTS, TRANSGENDER EQUALITY: A HANDBOOK FOR
ACTIVISTS AND POLICYMAKERS 1 (Paisley Currah & Shannon Minter, eds., 2000).
164 Julie A. Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision
Between Law and Biology , 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 265, 324 (1999).
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formance.165  Despite medical literature demonstrating that sex is
not fixed and unambiguous, cases attempting to determine sex
generally rely on “rigid” biological tests involving “chromo-
somes, genitalia, gonads, or some combination thereof.”166  In-
deed, the only transgendered claimants who receive recognition
are certain transsexual persons167 who are deemed to be engaged
in authentic transition from one biological sex to another.  In the
law of sex determination, acting as if  is not enough.
Case law related to gendered dress is particularly illustrative of
the legal refusal to recognize a theory of gender as performance.
Attire, as an aspect of self-presentation, is a crucial mode
through which individuals hold themselves out to their communi-
ties as men or women.  However, the law does not allow (or pro-
tect) these performances unless they match up with an
individual’s “sex,” defined based on “biology.”
Indeed, enforcement of sumptuary laws that proscribe certain
sex-specific modes of dress demonstrates that courts will not ac-
cept performance as evidence of sex.  Innumerable municipal or-
dinances have been enforced to prohibit cross-dressing.168
Patricia Cain describes the widespread perception among gay
165 This is despite the analogous structure of race and sex classification systems.
See  Julie A. Greenberg, Deconstructing Binary Race and Sex Categories: A Compar-
ison of the Multiracial and Transgendered Experience , 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 917,
921-22 (2002) (“Most scholars and legal institutions now agree that race cannot be
defined by biological factors and that race has been socially constructed. Sex classifi-
cation systems, on the other hand, are still based primarily on the assumptions that
sex is binary, unambiguous, and can be biologically determined, despite scientific
research that indicates that none of these assumptions are completely accurate.”).
166 Greenberg, supra  note 164, at 267, 325. R
167 A “transsexual person” is defined as one who experiences “a conflict between
one’s physical sex and one’s gender identity as a man or a woman.”  Green, supra
note 163, at 3. R
168 See  Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History ,
79 VA. L. REV. 1551, 1564 n.85 (1993).  In People v. Gillespi,  for example, a New
York vagrancy law that defined a vagrant as “a person, who having his face painted,
discolored, covered or concealed, or being otherwise disguised, in a manner calcu-
lated to prevent his being identified, appears in a road or public highway” was used
to prosecute a man dressed as a woman.  202 N.E.2d 565, 565 (N.Y. 1964) (citing
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 887(7) (forbidding disguises except in cases of masquer-
ade parties or by special permission)); see also  People v. Archibald, 260 N.E.2d 871
(N.Y. 1970) (upholding the conviction of a man dressed as a woman under the same
statute). Katherine M. Franke quotes George A. Chauncey, Jr. in her 1995 article,
The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex From
Gender: “by the turn of the century the police used [the law] primarily to harass
cross-dressing men and women on the streets.”  Katherine M. Franke, The Central
Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sex From Gender , 144
U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1995) (quoting GEORGE A. CHAUNCEY, JR., GAY NEW YORK:
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men and lesbians that they would violate the law for wearing too
few gender-appropriate garments.  Cain writes that there was an
“understanding among gay men and lesbians in the 1950s and
1960s that they were subject to arrest unless they had on three
garments appropriate to their gender.”169  In City of Chicago v.
Wilson , the city gave four justifications for its sumptuary law:
“(1) to protect citizens from being misled or defrauded; (2) to aid
in the description and detection of criminals; (3) to prevent
crimes in washrooms; and (4) to prevent inherently antisocial
conduct which is contrary to the accepted norms of our
society.”170
Two of these justifications listed by the City of Chicago for its
sumptuary law, namely, “to protect citizens from being misled”
and “to prevent inherently antisocial conduct,” indicate that
sumptuary laws are intended to protect third-party interests and
the public interest in the institution of stable gender identity.
Third parties may be interested in knowing who is male or fe-
male for the purposes of enforcing gender roles and determining
who is eligible for heterosexual coupling.  The other two justifica-
tions for Chicago’s sumptuary law, namely, catching criminals
and “preventing crimes in washrooms,” seem to conflate trans-
vestism with other sorts of criminality.171  These justifications are
premised on the assumption that those who defy gender norms
are likely to commit crimes.
However, transsexuals have secured protection from sumptu-
GENDER, URBAN CULTURE AND THE MAKING OF A GAY MALE WORLD, 1890-1940,
307 (1989)).
169 Although Cain was unable to track down any statutory reference to the “three
garment rule,” she cites several anecdotal accounts of the widespread harassment of
transvestites by legal authorities that generated this belief.  Cain, supra  note 168, at R
1551 n.85 (citing MARTIN DUBERMAN, STONEWALL 299 n.39 (1993); LILLIAN
FADERMAN, ODD GIRLS AND TWILIGHT LOVERS:  A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE IN
TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA 185, 335 n.11 (1991) (two women arrested for
cross-dressing in a gay bar in San Francisco in 1957); MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED
INTERESTS:  CROSS-DRESSING & CULTURAL ANXIETY 141 (1992) (Joan Nestle re-
ports that she was advised to “[a]lways wear three pieces of women’s clothing . . . so
the vice squad can’t bust you for transvestism.”)).
170 389 N.E.2d 522, 532 (Ill. 1978).  Section 192-8 of the Municipal Code of the
City of Chicago provided that “Any person who shall appear in a public place . . . in
a dress not belonging to his or her sex, with intent to conceal his or her sex, . . . shall
be fined not less than twenty dollars nor more than five hundred dollars for each
offense.”
171 This may result from the tendency to “pathologize” transvestites and assume
they are societal deviants likely to flaunt all legal norms.  Franke, supra  note 168, at
61.
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ary ordinances.  Martha Ertman writes that although “regulation
of cross-dressing has long been used to harass gay people for fail-
ing to dress in gender-appropriate clothing,” sumptuary “ordi-
nances have been held unconstitutional as applied to
transsexuals, individuals in transition from one sex to an-
other.”172  In City of Columbus v. Zanders , the defendant was
tried for wearing women’s clothing and makeup and impersonat-
ing a female in violation of an Ohio municipal law.173  The court
held that the defendant was not guilty because the unlawful act
was not a result of her free will: “the true transsexual suffers
from a mental defect over which he has little practical con-
trol.”174  The court cited medical evidence that the defendant was
a “true transsexual,” “scoring very high on the feminine scale,”
and feeling like a “female trapped in a male body belonging to
someone else.”175  The court also heard evidence that “[t]he legal
motive is strong in all transsexuals.  They want a change of their
legal status.  Red tape is their worst enemy.”176  In City of Chi-
cago v. Wilson , the defendants were transsexuals undergoing psy-
chiatric therapy in preparation for a sex-reassignment
operation.177  The court held that the city’s alleged justifications
amounted to an “aesthetic preference” that was outweighed by
the defendants’ medical needs.178  The court pointed to an Illi-
nois law authorizing a new certificate of birth following sex-reas-
signment surgery as evidence of the legislature’s recognition of
the validity of the procedure.179
Transsexuals have been less successful in securing the protec-
tion of antidiscrimination laws.  Although Title VII of the Civil
172 Martha M. Ertman, Sexuality: Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities:
Not Heaven, but Not Hell Either , 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107, 1128-29 (1996).
173 266 N.E.2d 602 (Mun. Ct. Ohio 1970).  Section 2343.04 of the Columbus Mu-
nicipal Code reads, “No person shall appear upon any public street or other public
place in a state of nudity or in a dress not belonging to his or her sex, or in an
indecent or lewd dress.”
174 Zanders, 266 N.E.2d at 606.
175 Id.  at 603.
176 Id.  at 605.
177 389 N.E.2d 522 (Ill. 1978). See also  Doe v. McConn, 489 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex.
1980).  Section 28-42.4 of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Houston provided
that “It shall be unlawful for any person to appear on any public street, sidewalk,
alley, or other public thoroughfare dressed with the designed intent to disguise his or
her true sex as that of the opposite sex.”  The statute was found unconstitutional as
applied to transsexuals. Id . The opinion cited the holding and rationale of City of
Chicago v. Wilson . Id . at 80.
178 389 N.E.2d at 525.
179 Id .
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Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of sex, case law has established that Title VII does not pro-
hibit employer regulations that establish dress codes on a sex dis-
criminatory basis.180  In Fagan v. National Cash Register Co. , a
man was fired from his job for long hair.181  Women were not
subject to similar regulations.182  The man sued for sex discrimi-
nation under Title VII.183  The court took notice of customary
differences in dress, concluding that:
[R]easonable regulations prescribing good grooming stan-
dards are not at all uncommon in the business world, indeed,
taking account of basic differences in male and female phy-
siques and common differences in customary dress of male
and female employees, it is not usually thought that there is
unlawful discrimination “because of sex.”184
Several courts have followed this reasoning, holding that “dis-
tinctions in employment practices between men and women on
the basis of something other than immutable or protected charac-
teristics do not inhibit employment opportunity” for the pur-
poses of Title VII.185
Likewise, in Terry v. EEOC , an employer refused to hire a
preoperative transgendered woman as a restaurant waitress/host-
ess.186  The court dismissed the complaint because:
[Terry] is still a male; at this point he only desires to be female.
He is not being refused employment because he is a man or
because he is a woman. Under these facts, Title VII and the
constitution do not protect him. The law does not protect
males dressed or acting as females and vice versa.187
Nor have transgendered individuals secured protection from
180 Indeed, “[c]ourts have consistently refused to include transsexuals in the pro-
tected class of individuals under Title VII because they have assumed that ‘sex’ in
the statute is used to denote ‘traditional notions of sex.’”  Greenberg, supra  note
164, at 320, (citing Holloway v. Arthur Andersen, 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977)). R
181 481 F.2d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
182 Id.  at 1121.
183 Id.
184 Id.  at 1117 n.3.
185 Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ’g Co. 507 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1975) (en
banc) (man fired for long hair under grooming policy that applied only to men); see,
e.g. , Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,  569 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1978) (man was not hired
because interviewer believed he had “effeminate characteristics”); Lanigan v. Bart-
lett & Co. Grain, 466 F. Supp. 1388 (W.D. Mo. 1979) (female secretary fired for
wearing a pantsuit to work).
186 No. 80-C-408, 1980 WL 334 (E.D. Wis. Dec. 10, 1980).
187 Id.  at *3.
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sex-specific dress codes based on the Americans with Disabilities
Act, which prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of
disability.188  In Doe v. Boeing , the Washington Supreme Court
rejected a disability discrimination claim by a preoperative trans-
gendered woman who refused to follow the company’s “transsex-
ual dress code,” which required her to avoid calling attention to
herself with “obviously feminine clothing such as dresses, skirts,
or frilly blouses.”189  The court held that the employer’s policy
was a reasonable accommodation of her condition, and thus did
not violate Washington’s Law Against Discrimination.190
What interests are served by sumptuary laws that regulate
dress and Title VII grooming cases refusing to extend protection
to transvestites?  By refusing the claims of transsexuals, “courts
underscored the futility of human agency to alter an individual’s
sex.”191  Sumptuary laws are relics of the feudal system.  Marjorie
Garber writes that in medieval and early modern Europe, sump-
tuary laws were designed to regulate dress in order “to mark out
as visible and above all legible  distinctions of wealth and rank
within a society undergoing changes that threatened to blur or
even obliterate such distinctions.”192  In the United States today,
these laws serve a similar function: ensuring that gender distinc-
tions remain legible.  The legibility of sex/gender distinctions is
the basis of sexual segregation in such quotidian contexts as
restrooms.193  Presumably, third-party and societal interests
would be secured by a doctrine of performance reification.  How-
ever, no such doctrine has emerged.  This may be because certain
of the public interests in the sex/gender system are not protected
by a theory of performance reification.  Courts explain the neces-
sity of stable gender performances in terms of propagating the
species.  Katherine Franke notes that “some courts have been
willing to go so far as to stake the survival of the species on the
188 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000).
189 846 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1993).
190 Id.  at 534.
191 Kenji Yoshino, Covering , 111 YALE L.J. 769, 920 (2002).
192 GARBER, supra  note 169, at 26. R
193 In Doe v. Boeing , the litmus test for Doe’s adherence to the dress code was
her ability to use the men’s restroom without complaint.  846 P.2d 531, 533-34
(Wash. 1993) (“[H]er attire would be deemed unacceptable when, in the supervisor’s
opinion, her dress would be likely to cause a complaint were Doe to use a men’s rest
room at a Boeing facility.”).  Katherine Franke remarks that “Curiously, in life and
in law, bathrooms seem to be the site where one’s sexual authenticity is tested.”
Franke, supra  note 171, at 69.
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ability to read gender correctly” because recognition of suitable
sex partners is required to “reproduce the species.”194
The threat of transgendered individuals to the human species
may be overblown, but courts are nonetheless likely to protect
the legibility of sex/gender in the current political climate, in
which traditional gender roles are contested, transgendered indi-
viduals are equated with lesbians and gay men, and the debate
over the normative equivalency of lesbian and gay sexualities is a
“Kulturkampf.”195
4. Identity Determination Doctrines as Performance Reification
In the racial determination cases, courts examined evidence
that is structured much like the evidence that would support a
claim for adverse possession.  Just as the adverse possessor had
to occupy the claimed property, a claimant to white identity had
to occupy those segregated spaces marked as white: neighbor-
hoods, schools, and churches.  This behavior was not a mere pri-
vate domestic ordering.  Just as an adverse possessor had to hold
himself out as the landowner under a claim of right, a person
who passed for white had to do so expressly in the community,
holding herself out as white on a consistent and continuous basis.
The community had to accept the claimant as white and rely on
that presumption.  The interests protected here were the interests
of the legal system in ensuring the stability and administrability
of its regime of segregation—because of the arbitrary and porous
nature of the color line, rigid enforcement of a true “one-drop
rule” would have threatened the majority of white Southerners.
If the community accepted an individual as white, courts were
willing to confer status on that person as white, even in the face
of evidence that the claimant might have black ancestry.  How-
ever, in the sex determination cases, a doctrine that gives pri-
macy to performance is not discernable.  Courts in this context
look to evidence of “natural status.”  Presumably, only a seam-
less performance, such as that of the transsexual who undergoes
a sex reassignment surgery, would succeed in the eyes of the law.
Unlike adverse possession, these doctrines of identity determi-
nation are troubled by biological conceptions of natural status.
The chart below demonstrates the closer parallels between these
doctrines and the concept of “functional parenthood”:
194 Franke, supra  note 171, at 61.
195 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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FIGURE 2
Parenthood Race Sex
Private Status Biological White “Blood” Biological Man/
Parent Woman
Public Caretaking/ Passing/Fraud Appropriate/
Performance Kidnapping Cross-Dressed
Legal Formality Legal Race Sex Designation
Adoption, Designations on on Birth
Custody, or Birth, Death, Certificate,
Guardianship and Marriage Driver’s
Certificates License,
Passport
In the identity determination contexts, when private status and
public performance line up, the law is highly likely to enforce the
rights and duties of the claimant.  However, when private status
is in doubt, the situation becomes more difficult.  The person at-
tempting to pass as white, man, or woman may succeed even in
the face of contrary evidence of “blood” or biology, so long as his
or her performance is seamless and takes for granted the idea of
race or sex as natural status .
II
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR UNDERSTANDING
PERFORMANCE REIFICATION
Can legal theory shed light on the driving forces behind these
doctrines of performance reification?  Neither legal formalism,
which describes law as an attempt to codify a preexisting natural
status , nor legal realism, which describes law as engaged in the
enforcement of private contracts , is adequate to illuminate the
doctrines of performance reification.196  Another theoretical lens
is necessary to examine the law engaged in recognition and reifi-
cation of successful public performances. Application of Judith
196 In mapping the status/contract distinction onto the formalist/legal realist one, I
do not mean to gloss over important formalist theorizing about contracts or legal
realist reification of status.  Rather, I hope that this association will serve the provi-
sional purposes of a descriptive account of jurisprudential shifts in theorizing about
property, marriage, parenthood, and segregation.  The notion of status I propose
here is any characteristic deemed extralegal, essential, fixed, and immutable.  Like-
wise, the notion of contract I propose here is not confined merely to economic trans-
actions, but rather, is related to choice and agreement in many spheres of social
interaction.
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Butler’s theory of performativity to doctrines such as adverse
possession provides a crucial conceptual perspective.
A. Formalism and Realism
One theory of the meaning of legal institutions such as prop-
erty, marriage, parenthood, and segregation is that these legal in-
stitutions stand apart from society, codifying natural phenomena
according to a set of necessary rules derived from the common
law.  This description of law comes closest to the classical theory
of legal formalism, as embodied in decisions such as Lochner v.
New York .197  Formalism “describes legal theories that stress the
importance of rationally uncontroversial reasoning in legal deci-
sion, whether from highly particular rules or quite abstract prin-
ciples.”198  Law is seen as autonomous from ideological
considerations and immanent to the societal disputes it re-
solves.199  For a classical formalist, legal reasoning is an exercise
in the discovery of logical truths, not the forging of political com-
promises.200  Formalist reasoning includes a preference for
bright-line rules over standards.201  A person is endowed with
rights when they “vest,” as though a metaphysical on/off switch
were flipped.202  The grand aspiration of formalism is to achieve
clarity on the gapless grid-like classificatory scheme that provides
197 198 U.S. 45 (1908) (invalidating statute setting maximum working hours for
bakers due to its interference with bakers’ freedom of contract in contravention of
Due Process Clause, which protects freedom of contract as a natural liberty inter-
est).  Formalism was characteristic of U.S. jurisprudence in the late nineteenth cen-
tury and is often associated with thinkers such as Christopher Columbus Langdell.
See, e.g. , C. C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS:
WITH REFERENCES AND CITATIONS (Little, Brown & Co. 1871).  There are many
types of formalism and disagreements on the precise meaning of the term.  See
THOMAS C. GREY, THE NEW FORMALISM, 1-5 (Stanford Public Law and Legal The-
ory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 4, Sept. 6, 1999), at  http://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/delivery.cfm/991224402.pdf?abstractid=200732, for an illuminating taxon-
omy of contemporary formalisms.
198 Thomas C. Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy,  45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 9 (1983).
199 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement , 96 HARV.
L. REV. 561, 571 (1983).
200 Langdell saw law as a science:  a complete system of deductive reasoning. See
Grey, supra  note 198, at 6. R
201 See  Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now , 76 CAL. L. REV. 467, 496-99
(1988) (“[F]ormalism included a commitment to objective standards.”).
202 For example, according to Joseph Beale, a theorist of conflicts of law, a state
applied another state’s law not for policy reasons, but because the claimant’s rights
had “vested” in the foreign jurisdiction.  2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 5.4 (1935).
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certain answers to all societal disputes.203
Formalism is often criticized for its abstract detachment and
treatment of law as a closed system.  Formalism thus takes for
granted common law assumptions about status.  It presumes the
existence of a private sphere of behavior apart from the law that
is protected based on a theory of natural rights.204  Cass Sunstein
explains:
[T]he Lochner Court posited the existence of a natural and
prepolitical private sphere, one that served as a brake on legis-
lation . . . [T]he problem with the Lochner Court was its reli-
ance on common law and status quo baselines; the Court was
unable to see the ways in which those baselines were impli-
cated in, indeed a product of law.205
One thread of formalistic reasoning suggests arguments against
adverse possession-like doctrines.  If objective bright-line rules
are to be preferred over flexible standards, then formality should
be required for ownership, marriage, family law, and segregation.
The existence of formalities such as title to property, marriage
certificates, official adoption papers, records of ancestry, and
birth certificates would be determinative.  This would serve the
“practical social demand that official action be reasonably pre-
dictable, so that people may plan their lives.”206  Reliance on the
presence or absence of formality avoids the need for courts to
make sticky normative judgments about whatever else owner-
ship, marriage, family, race, and sex may mean.
However, a case can be made for doctrines such as adverse
possession from the perspective of classical formalism.  The codi-
fication of social phenomena such as the adverse possessor, the
common law spouse, the functional parent, the biracial person,
and the transgendered person serves the classificatory aspirations
of the formalist’s gapless system.  These doctrines can be derived
203 Unger, supra  note 199, at 564 (describing formalism as a “search for a method R
of deduction from a gapless system of rules”); MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY
AND SOCIETY 62 (Max Rheinstein, ed., Edward Shils, trans., 1966) (“We refer to
‘systematization’ . . . it represents an integration of all analytically derived legal pro-
positions in such a way that they constitute a logically clear, internally consistent,
and, at least in theory, gapless system of rules, under which, it is implied, all conceiv-
able fact situations must be capable of being logically subsumed lest their order lack
an effective guaranty.”).
204 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival , 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1579
(1988).
205 Id.  at 1579-80.
206 Grey, supra  note 198, at 10-11.
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through common law reasoning from principles of property, mar-
riage, family law, and segregation.  The logic is that in each of
these cases, the claimant is possessed of an authentic natural sta-
tus and therefore the absence of appropriate legal documenta-
tion is inconsequential.  Performance is a proxy for status.
But what constitutes authentic, normative status as a property
owner, parent, spouse, white person, man, or woman?  Formal-
ism conceals this foundational normative question with layers of
deductive reasoning.207  Normative judgments are taken for
granted as descriptive features of the common law and necessary
steps in logical chains of reasoning.
The formalist explanation is incomplete.  The concept of “au-
thenticity” is not doing the work in these squatter’s rights doc-
trines.  Good faith is not an element of adverse possession.
Ancestry was not the pivotal factor in the race determination
cases.208  Rather, these cases turn on the reliance interests of
claimants, third parties, and communities.209
A second theory of the meaning of property, marriage,
parenthood, and segregation is that the aim of these institutions
is to establish contractual rules to enforce private agreements.
Legal realism is a jurisprudential reaction to the perceived diffi-
culties with classical formalism.210  Instead of viewing the law as
a set of static, apolitical, doctrinal categorizations of social life,
legal realists view the law as a tool for reflecting and shaping
private behavior.211  Laura Kalman writes that realists emphasize
the “idiosyncrasy” of judicial decisionmaking, focusing on fact
situations and social realities instead of abstract rules.”212  Law is
forged through policy arguments, moral justifications, and insti-
tutional considerations, not discovered through deduction from
abstract principles.213
Legal realism is often criticized as reducing the law to post hoc
207 See  Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology , 110 HARV. L. REV. 877, 900 (1997).
208 See supra  notes 14-15, 58, 106-106, 144-144, and accompanying text. R
209 See supra  notes 14-15, 58, 106-106, 144-144, and accompanying text. R
210 See, e.g. , JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (GLOUCESTER,
MASS., PETER SMITH 1970) (1931); Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach , 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935); Morris Cohen, On Absolut-
isms in Legal Thought , 84 U. PA. L. REV. 681 (1936); John Dewey, Logical Method
and Law , 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924); Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence:
The Next Step , 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930) .
211 LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE:  1927-1960, 3 (1986).
212 Id.  at 6-7.
213 Id.  at 176-81.
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justifications or even what the judge ate for breakfast.214  Con-
temporary formalists criticize legal realists for a vision of law
without the advantages of “predictability, stability and constraint
of decisionmakers.”215  Such an ad hoc system is antidemocratic
because it allows judges to usurp the roles of legislatures, opens
the door to arbitrariness and unfairness, and cannot maintain
public legitimacy.216  However, legal realists, like formalists, are
concerned with the predictability of legal rules.217  Legal realists
posit that, “[s]ocial context, the facts of the case, judges’ ideolo-
gies, and professional consensus critically influence individual
judgments and patterns of decisions over time . . . study of such
factors could improve predictability of decisions.”218
Legal realists forced common law assumptions and baselines
out of the closet.  In their analyses of Lochner,  legal realists
sought to demonstrate that the formalists’ conceptions of “prop-
erty,” “freedom of contract,” and “liberty” were not apolitical—
they already embodied government involvement in the market,
premised on common law assumptions that could be traced back
to status-like rationales.219
However, while formalism risks masking normative judgments
behind doctrinal compulsions, realism risks making law no more
than crude politics, with no normative barometer, only compet-
ing subjective interests.  The realist impulse to loosen formal doc-
trines to accommodate “social realities” is also a mode of
masking normative judgments behind allegedly descriptive social
science or observation.  As Reva Siegel argues, “when a society
undertakes to disestablish caste relations, it may instead translate
them from an antiquated and therefore socially dissonant dis-
course to a contemporary and socially acceptable discourse.”220
214 Singer, supra  note 201, at 470. R
215 Frederick Schauer, Formalism , 97 YALE L.J. 509, 547 (1988).  Schauer ex-
pounds an updated version of formalism, although he disagrees with the “formalis-
tic” reasoning of Lochner . Id.  at 511; see also  Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules , 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
216 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 25 (Amy Gutmann,
ed., 1997).
217 Singer, supra  note 201, at 471. R
218 Id.  at 470-71.
219 Id.  at 499; see  Sunstein, supra  note 204, at 1692 (“[T]he theoretical basis of the R
Lochner era foundered on a mounting recognition that the market status quo was
itself the product of government choices.  When private property was viewed as a
creation of such choices, efforts to reallocate property rights could be understood as
a legitimate effort to promote the public good.”).
220 Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law , 82 GEO. L.J. 2127,
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As a descriptive matter, legal realism illuminates a great deal
about doctrines such as adverse possession.  Realists critique the
formalist definition of property as “that sole and despotic domin-
ion which one man claims and exercises over the external things
of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individ-
ual in the universe.”221  In response to the formalist idea of prop-
erty as a natural and prepolitical relationship between a person
and a resource, legal realists such as Felix Cohen defined prop-
erty as “a relationship among human beings such that the so-
called owner can exclude others from certain activities or permit
others to engage in those activities and in either case secure the
assistance of the law in carrying out his decision.”222  This notion
of property better fits adverse possession, which protects the con-
tractual reliance interests of the claimant, rather than the formal-
ist notion of despotic domain.223
In contrast to the formalist idea of marriage as status, legal
realists reconceive of marriage as contract.  Under the Black-
stonian common law model, the married woman had no right to
contract; her rights were submerged into her husband’s under the
doctrine of coverture.224  During the nineteenth century, statutes
gave married women rights to property, earnings, and to enter
into legal transactions, under the rubric of the move from status
to contract.225  The twentieth-century movement towards no-
2210 (1994); see also  MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 222-
24 (1987) (characterizing the “status to contract” story as fundamentally
conservative).
221 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES *2. But see  Rose, supra  note 17, at R
603-04 (arguing that Blackstone was well aware that this description of property was
more of an idealized rhetorical trope than a self-evident definition).
222 Cohen, supra  note 21, at 373.
223 The impulse to examine property and contract in terms of reliance interests as
opposed to doctrinal formalism is part of the intellectual tradition of legal realism.
See, e.g. , L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages : 1 , 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 2 ,
46 YALE L.J. 373 (1937) (reconceptualizing contract law away from formalistic con-
sideration and towards policy analysis of reliance interests); Singer, supra  note 13
(analyzing property law in terms of reliance interests).
224 BLACKSTONE, supra  note 221, at *442 (“By marriage, the husband and wife R
are one person in law:  that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is
suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that
of the husband:  under whose wing, protection, and cover , she performs
everything.”).
225 Siegel, supra  note 220, at 2128.  Siegel concludes that “[s]tatutory reform mod- R
ified but did not abolish the law of coverture.” Id .  This argument was powerful
because at the time, “the paradigm of contract exerted extraordinary influence in
legal thought.”  Dubler, supra  note 58, at 1891. R
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fault divorce, for example, represents the view that married sta-
tus is not fixed and unchangeable, but rather, is freely chosen and
can be undone.226  Spouses can enter into antenuptial contractual
agreements establishing the distribution of assets upon dissolu-
tion of the marriage.
The legal realist’s preference for judicial discretion over inflex-
ible doctrinal rules manifests itself in marriage law.  Jane Murphy
writes, “Nowhere is this ideal of individualized justice used to
justify broad, unfettered judicial discretion more than in family
law.”227  This resistance to formal rules comes from ideas about
the “reality” of marital relations: “[f]amily law tries to regulate
people in the most complex, most emotional, most mysterious,
most individual, most personal, most idiosyncratic of realms.  It is
absurdly difficult to write rules of conduct for such an area that
are clear, just, and effective.”228  The recognition of common law
marriage is an attempt by the law to match up with social reali-
ties of “married” couples whose marriages are not solemnized
through ceremony or licensed by the state.  Dubler analogizes
this to the legal realist’s increasing reliance on “evidence of pat-
terns of performance” in contract law.229
A legal realist would reenvision parenthood as a chosen rela-
tionship that serves practical goals, not a natural status.  The
226 See UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT, 9A U.L.A. 91 (1979).  All fifty
states recognize no-fault divorce. See  Andrea Brobeil, Family Law Chapter: Mar-
riage and Divorce , 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 529, 538 (2004).
227 Jane C. Murphy, Eroding the Myth of Discretionary Justice in Family Law:
The Child Support Experiment,  70 N.C. L. REV. 209, 209 (1991); see also  Mary Ann
Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession
Law , 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1986) (“[I]n domestic relations law, more than in
any other area of private law, trial judges have been expressly granted broad discre-
tion to try to achieve individualized justice on a case-by-case basis.”).
228 Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the
UMDA’s Best-Interest Standard , 89 MICH. L. REV. 2215, 2218 (1991); see also  Mur-
phy, supra  note 227, at 211 (“[D]ecisions requiring complex judgments about past or R
future human behavior have been viewed as particularly inappropriate for formulae
or rules.”).
229 See  Dubler, supra  note 29, at 1007 (citing MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960:  THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 35-
39 (1992)).  However, Dubler argues that at the same time that legal realists were
transforming contract law, many states were abolishing their doctrines of common-
law marriage for formalist reasons:  “A growing judicial reliance on sustained con-
duct, rather than the exact moment of the inception of a contract, presumably left
courts vulnerable to the deceptive or misleading performances of the parties to the
contract.” Id.  This fear of deceptive performances was fatal in the case of marriage
because of the perceived importance of marriage to the social order. Id.  at 1008.
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Blackstonian idea of property-like rights in children230 has been
replaced with a pragmatic rule: the “best interests of the child”
standard.231  The ALI Principles replace the ideas of property-
like rights in children with a preference for parenting plans: con-
tract-like, voluntary agreements between the parties to a dis-
pute.232  The increasing availability of techniques of artificial
insemination makes it hard for the law to even define a natural
parent.233  The move towards recognition of functional parents
by the ALI resonates with the theories of legal realists.  This
movement is a “utilitarian metamorphosis”: a self-consciously
pragmatic shift from notions of status to notions of functional-
ity—an attempt to mold the law into a better reflection of social
life.234  Furthermore, it is premised on scientific ideas about the
best path to child development.235  Formalist family law divided
the world of parenthood into people who were legal parents,
with a full set of rights and duties towards children, and people
who were strangers, with no rights and duties towards children
whatsoever.236  Functional parents have rights and duties with re-
gards to children that are not coextensive with those of legal par-
ents, breaking down the clean formalist division.  Of course, the
ALI effort to classify and codify the rights and duties of func-
230 BLACKSTONE supra  note 221, at *446. R
231 Francis J. Catania, Jr., Learning from the Process of Decision: The Parenting
Plan , 2001 BYU L. REV. 857, 860 (2001) (“The ‘best interests of the child’ standard
has been widely touted as the standard by which child custody disputes are adjudi-
cated in the United States since the nineteenth century.  The standard was certainly
an improvement over ancient property-based approaches to child custody.”).
232 The ALI Principles suggest that in the resolution of custody disputes, parents
propose contract-like “parenting plans,” establishing the division of parenting tasks.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, at I8 (“Chapter 2 assumes that parental agreement R
is, generally speaking, good for children, and that it is difficult for courts to accom-
plish meaningful review that is likely to improve measurably those agreements.”).
233 See  John Lawrence Hill, What Does it Mean to be a “Parent”? The Claims of
Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights , 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1991).
234 Difonzo, supra  note 73, at 927 (describing the ALI Principles as an “effort to R
adapt the law to the emerging social reality of functional families”).
235 See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 53 (1979) (“The least detrimental alternative . . . is
that specific placement and procedure which maximizes, in accord with the child’s
sense of time on the basis of short-term predictions given the limitations of knowl-
edge, his or her opportunity for being wanted and for maintaining on a continuous
basis a relationship with at least one adult who is or will become his psychological
parent.”)
236 See  Julie Shapiro, De Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the New
ALI Principles,  35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 769, 769-72 (1999) (discussing the rights of
“legal parents” versus “legal strangers”).
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tional parents into a “unified field theory of the family”237 is a
formalist impulse, contrary to the “largely limitless discretion . . .
common in family law.”238
Performance-based modes of race determination can also be
analyzed as a realist phenomenon.  Sharfstein writes that the idea
of race as “blood” was a formalist concept: “[t]he conception of
‘blood’ as a kind of title gave whites, as owners of this ‘property,’
the right to exclude blacks, forming a legal infrastructure of ine-
quality.”239  In response to the formalist idea of race as natural
status and the “one-drop rule,”240 legal realists reenvisioned race
as functional, reflective of social life, and possibly even contrac-
tual.241  Race based on association is a contractual concept:  race
is chosen based on whom an individual associates with.242
Anachronistically, it is more possible to examine race from a
contractarian standpoint: race is a freely chosen aspect of iden-
tity, determinable based on a person’s self-identification via the
237 Difonzo, supra  note 73, at 925.  The Principles are a formalist codification of R
contractarian principles:  “these features fuse to form the backbone of a unified field
theory of the family, one whose unspoken aim is finally to consolidate the no-fault
divorce revolution.” Id.
238 Ira Mark Ellman, Brigitte M. Bodenheimer Memorial Lecture on the Family:
Inventing Family Law,  32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 871 (1999). See also  Difonzo,
supra  note 73, at 925 (“[T]he Principles conceive of family law as entering a consoli- R
dation phase, in which scattershot judicial discretion is displaced by delimiting
rules.”).
239 Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1479; see also  Teresa Zackodnik, Fixing the R
Color Line: The Mulatto, Southern Courts, and Racial Identity , 53 AM. Q. 420, 424
(2001) (describing attempts to assign racial status based on performance as attempts
by Southerners to divine “true” and “essential” racial identity through its outward
manifestations in behavior).
240 The “one-drop rule” is only one example of a formalistic rule of race determi-
nation—states also employed rules assigning “Negro” status to anyone with one
quarter or one eighth “Negro blood.”  Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1477.  Sharf- R
stein writes that these rules better reflected the racial status quo. Id.  The move
away from the “one-drop rule” thus can be interpreted as a shift from formalism to
realism.
241 “This story could be read as the triumph of custom over law, in which social
practices of defining race through performance overwhelmed formal rules of ances-
try and ‘blood.’”  Gross, supra  note 112, at 181.  Gross explores, but ultimately re- R
jects, the theory that the cases on racial determination can be understood as the
evolution from formalism to realism, for reasons I will detail in Part II.C, infra .
242 One litigant proposed a definition of blackness as anyone “who fixes his own
status, or has it fixed for him, by association with the negro race.”  Sharfstein, supra
note 114, at 1505, (citing Plaintiff’s Brief at 3, Ferrall v. Ferrall, 69 S.E. 60 (N.C. R
1910) (on file with North Carolina Superior Court Library, Raleigh, N.C.)).  The
observation that someone’s racial associations might be “fixed for him” demon-
strates that the contractual model is not entirely apt.
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checkboxes on census forms, standardized tests, college admis-
sion applications, and employment forms.
By contrast, doctrines of sex determination have not made the
jump from formalist, status-based reasoning to realist, contract-
based reasoning.  Indeed, the contractarian value of free choice is
absent from the case law on sex determination, which protects
only those who lack  free choice in sexual determination.  The
transsexual defendant in City of Columbus v. Zanders  was pro-
tected because her cross-dressing was not  construed as a choice,
but rather as “a mental defect over which he has little practical
control.”243
Legal realism explains a great deal about the squatter’s rights
doctrines.  These doctrines can be conceptualized as protecting
contractual interests while eschewing formalistic notions of au-
thentic status.  A contract requires mutual agreement and consid-
eration.  Adverse possession and analogous doctrines require a
notorious claim of right that is acquiesced to by the public.
These elements mimic the doctrinal elements of a contract.  The
claim of right that is notorious functions as an offer made by the
adverse possessor.  The requirement of acquiescence by the titu-
lar owner, common law spouse, or legal parent is akin to the con-
tractual requirement of acceptance.  Often the squatter relies on
this acquiescence at considerable expense.  For example, the ad-
verse possessor behaves as an owner, maintaining the property,
the common law spouse fulfills the “duties” of a wife or husband,
and the functional parent takes care of the child.  However, these
services are not bargained for as consideration per se.  Rather, it
is reasonable and foreseeable for the original claimant to expect
that acquiescence would induce the squatter’s reliance.244  In-
deed, reliance interests play a large part in cases involving all
three doctrines.245  The Restatement recognizes reliance in lieu
of consideration where enforcement of the contract is necessary
to avoid injustice.246  This doctrine is referred to as promissory
estoppel.247
But a bare contract claim of this sort would not hold up in
court.  The mutual agreement element of the contract is lacking.
243 266 N.E.2d 602, 606 (Mun. Ct. Ohio 1970).
244 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
245 See supra  Parts I.A.2, I.B.2, I.B.4, & I.C.2.
246 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
247 See, e.g. , Ricketts v. Scothorn, 77 N.W. 365 (Neb. 1898).
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Here the former claimant accepts by silence.  The Restatement
of Contracts establishes that silence can constitute acceptance of
a contract only under certain conditions: where the offeree ac-
cepts the services of the offeror knowing that they were offered
with the expectation of compensation, or where it is clear from
the offeree’s previous statements or dealings that silence means
acceptance.248  In the case of the adverse possessor, courts do not
require proof that the titular owner agreed to the adverse posses-
sor’s claim of right.  Likewise, there is no requirement that com-
mon law spouses mutually agreed to treat each other according
to the expectations of a legal marriage.  In addition, there is no
evidence that legal parents are aware that the child support activ-
ities of potential functional parents might confer rights to visita-
tion.  Nor is there evidence that white communities were aware
at the time of segregation that the community’s association with
a person of uncertain racial status would grant that person the
privileges of whiteness.
Furthermore, the contract model is merely an addition to, not
a replacement for, the formalist status model.  These institutions
offer a one-size-fits-all, take-it-or-leave-it option.249  Insofar as
individuals have a choice, it is only at the outset.  After they
agree to enter the institution, they are stuck with a formalistic
status.  Thus, Marsha Garrison calls marriage a “status contract”:
“with terms that are largely determined by legislatures rather
than by the individual marriage partners themselves.”250  This
distinction “represents an extremely important qualification to
the principle of freedom of contract.”251  As Merrill and Smith
explain, with regards to contract, “there is a potentially infinite
range of promises that the law will honor,” but “[g]enerally
speaking, the law will enforce as property only those interests
that conform to a limited number of standard forms.”252
These doctrines are justified as legal reactions to social reali-
ties that ensure efficiency and substantive justice.  In each case,
the interests of the “adverse possessor” are protected.  However,
a realist, law-and-economics approach to this issue requires an
248 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981).
249 Dubler, supra  note 58, at 1902. R
250 Marsha Garrison, An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation , 86
CAL. L. REV. 41, 106 (1998).
251 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle , 110 YALE L.J. 1, 5 (2000).
252 Id.  at 3.
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examination of the sorts of ex ante incentives that are created by
legal rules.253  There may be contract-like reasons for treating ad-
verse possession and its analogues like the institutions they
mimic.  But, if these institutions are about contracts, then the
right legal rule would create incentives for people to “get it in
writing”: to manifest intent to contract through legal formalities.
Legal formality is exactly that which is absent in the paradigm
case of the adverse possessor.  Imposing property, marriage,
parenting, and segregation on persons who did not agree to them
is in violation of the principles of autonomy and freedom of
contract.
B. Performativity
As a theoretical lens, neither status-based formalism nor con-
tract-based realism is sufficient to bring adverse possession and
analogous doctrines into focus.  However, both formalism and
realism contribute insights.  Although status-based formalism is
allegedly retrograde, there is nonetheless the sense that squat-
ter’s rights are protected because the squatter is actually the true
“owner” and has a prelegal right to recognition.  The private con-
tract model also explains a great deal.  Squatters must communi-
cate their intents to be owners, and there must be acquiescence
from other potential owners.  But two-party contract principles
would demand more than mere silence as a manifestation of ac-
ceptance.  There must be another angle.  Why do these doctrines
have a notoriety requirement that the squatter held him or her-
self out to the public at large?  Why are third-party interests rele-
vant?  Why do courts examine mimicry of legal formalities, such
as tax returns and voting records as evidence of “holding out”?
These doctrines recognize public performances: mimicry of not
only the social meaning of ownership, marriage, parenting, and
whiteness, but also mimicry of specific legal rights, duties, and
formalities.
Judith Butler’s idea of performativity is a crucial theoretical
lens through which to examine these doctrines.254  Butler devel-
ops her theory of performativity in the context of gender.  Her
253 See  Merrill, supra  note 12, at 1112 (arguing that adverse possession appears to R
have “escaped the attention of the modern law and economics movement” and pro-
posing liability rules for bad-faith adverse possessors).
254 See  Dubler, supra  note 29, at 1006-09 (applying Butler’s idea of parody to
common-law marriage); Gross, supra  note 112, at 112 n.6 (applying Butler’s theory R
of gender performativity to trials of race determination).
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starting point is the theory that “one is not born, but rather, be-
comes  a woman” through socialization.255  But Butler’s theory
goes beyond social constructionism.  For her, gender is consti-
tuted not just through shared social understandings, but “through
a stylized repetition of acts.”256  A person “does” his or her gen-
der through speech, dress, mannerisms, and so forth.
Butler critically questions a division that many feminists make
between “sex” as biological and “gender” as social.257  For But-
ler, gender has no essence, original, or ideal form, and neither
does sex.258  Genders and sexes purport to be natural and essen-
tial, but they are both constituted by “tacit collective agreement
to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders.”259
Kenji Yoshino explains Butler’s argument: “rather than conceiv-
ing of culture as a simple overlay on nature, culture must be seen
as the very realm through which we fashion our concept of the
natural . . . . Gender is actually constituting the thing whose ef-
fect it appears to be.”260
Although she does not deny biology, Butler seeks to analyze
how we come to understand the “biological,” “material,” and
“natural” dimensions of the body as gendered.261  Cultural con-
ventions place limits on the possibilities that we have for under-
standing our embodiment, and we reproduce those conventions
when we adopt them in order to understand our bodies as
“male” or “female.”  Enacting gender is a way of “taking up”
255 JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE 33 (1990).
256 Judith Butler, Performative Acts and Gender Constitution: An Essay in Phe-
nomenology and Feminist Theory , 40 THEATRE J. 519, 519 (1988).
257 Id.  at 521.
258 Id.
259 Id.  at 522.
260 Yoshino, supra  note 191, at 866.
261 The theory of performativity is not radical social constructionism:  “gender  is
not a noun, but neither is it a set of free-floating attributes.” BUTLER, supra  note
255, at 24.  Yoshino does not read Butler to be making the “strong performative R
claim” that “there is no biological substrate to sex.” See  Yoshino, supra  note 191, at
866. Rather, he reads Butler to be making a “weak performative claim”:
[T]here may be a biological component to sex, but that we will never be
sure what that biological component is, as we can only apprehend it
through culture (that is, gender). The weak performative claim thus differs
from the strong performative claim in two respects. First, it is an epistemo-
logical rather than an ontological claim. Second, the weak performative
claim suggests that “performative” modifies not categories of identity, but
rather aspects of identity.
Id.  at 868.
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certain cultural possibilities.262
Performativity is deeply connected to communication.  But-
ler’s theory of performativity derives from J.L. Austin’s theory of
speech acts.  Austin argues that speech has both constative and
performative aspects.263  Utterances are constative insofar as
they purport to describe some material reality—they can be true
or false.264  Speech is performative insofar as an utterance enacts
itself, for example, the statements “I promise” or “I bet you”
bring about certain effects.265  Austin further subdivides
performative aspects of speech into “illocutionary” and “perlocu-
tionary.”  Butler explains that illocutionary acts “are speech acts
that, in saying do what they say, and do it in the moment of that
saying; [perlocutionary acts] are speech acts that produce certain
effects as their consequence; by saying something, a certain effect
follows.”266  Butler combines this idea of performativity with the
notion of interpellation:  the idea that an act of discourse can call
into being the subject to which it refers.267  When a doctor utters,
“It’s a girl!” to a set of new parents, she “begins that long string
of interpellations by which the girl is transitively girled; gender is
ritualistically repeated, whereby the repetition occasions both the
risk of failure and the congealed effect of sedimentation.”268
Austin identifies what he calls “felicity conditions,” that must
be fulfilled “for the . . . ‘happy’ functioning of the performa-
tive.”269  The first of Austin’s felicity conditions posits that:
“[t]here must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a
certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering
of certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances.”270
For an utterance to be successful, it must cite previous utter-
ances.  For “It’s a girl!” to make sense, it must refer to a long
string of gendered words that help the community understand
262 Id.  at 521.
263 J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. Urmson & Marina Sbisa
eds., 2d ed. 1975).  Austin begins by arguing that there are two types of speech,
constative and performative, but as his argument develops, he acknowledges that all
speech has both constative and performative aspects. Id.
264 Id.
265 Id.  at 6.
266 JUDITH BUTLER, EXCITABLE SPEECH 3 (1997).
267 JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER 121-22 (1993).
268 Judith Butler, Burning Acts: Injurious Speech,  3 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUND-
TABLE 199, 204 (1996).
269 AUSTIN, supra  note 263, at 14. R
270 Id.
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what to expect out of babies called “girls.”  Utterances are a way
of “making linguistic community”:  tapping into a set of estab-
lished practices for a group of people that bind them in under-
standing one another.271  In order for an utterance to achieve a
performative effect, it must be applied by an appropriate person,
in the appropriate circumstances, through a correctly and com-
pletely executed conventional procedure.272
The single utterance, “It’s a girl!” does not a baby girl make.
The drama of gender is a repeat performance—it must be reen-
acted continually to form a pattern.  Butler writes, “the body be-
comes its gender through a series of acts which are renewed,
revised, and consolidated through time.”273  She explains, “[t]his
repetition is at once a reenactment and reexperiencing of a set of
meanings already socially established; it is the mundane and ritu-
alized form of their legitimation.”274  With each repetition, a con-
vention increases its legitimacy and status as normal and natural:
thus, gender “conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which
it is a repetition.”275
Although Butler’s theory of performativity was developed to
describe identity categories such as “man” and “woman,” the
theory also has descriptive power for legal institutions such as
property, marriage, parenthood, and racial segregation.  These
institutions involve the conference of identity categorizations,
such as “owner,” “husband,” “wife,” “parent,” and “white.”276
271 AUSTIN, supra  note 263.
272 Id.  at 14-15.
273 Butler, supra  note 256, at 523. R
274 Id.  at 526.
275 BUTLER, supra  note 267, at 12. R
276 It may seem strange to say that “owner” is an identity category on par with
“man” or “mother.”  This most likely stems from the fact that ownership is consid-
ered an economic label, and “commodification anxiety” prevents consideration of
marriage or parenthood as economic transactions. See supra  note 104.  Ownership R
also pertains to identity.  Margaret Jane Radin explains, “[m]ost people possess cer-
tain objects they feel are almost part of themselves . . . they are part of the way we
constitute ourselves as continuing personal entities in the world.”  Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood , 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 959 (1982) (arguing for
special legal protections for property rights to homes).  As President Bush stated,
“Owning a home lies at the heart of the American dream.  A home is a foundation
for families and a source of stability for communities.”  President George W. Bush,
Policy in Focus: Home Ownership , Radio Address to the Nation, June 15, 2002, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020615.html.  The income tax
code contains tax incentives reflective of the psychic import of home ownership to
American identity. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION:  PRINCIPLES AND POLICES 357-58 (4th ed. 2002).
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Adverse possession and analogous doctrines are best explained
by this performative model.  In each case, “acting as if” is tanta-
mount to “being”—but only if a stringent set of felicity condi-
tions is met.  One who lives on the land in a manner that courts
presume an owner would is an owner.  These acts cannot be iso-
lated or infrequent—continual, ritualized repetition is required.
A woman who only behaves as a wife while on vacation with her
husband in Florida is not a common law spouse.  It is essential to
each doctrine that the claimant hold her or himself out to the
community as an owner, spouse, parent, or white person because
these labels are fundamentally about communication to the pub-
lic at large.277  Two-party contract principles are not dispositive.
The audience for this performance is everywhere.  School teach-
ers, health care providers, and child- care workers are the rele-
vant audience when determining the status of a functional
parent.  Not only did the speech act have to be “notorious,” it
had to be successful, generating acquiescence from others who
may dispute the claimant’s rightful status, and acceptance from
the community at large.  Butler’s theory of performativity indi-
cates that if such an utterance is likely to be successful, it must
cite back to previous utterances or performances of property,
marriage, parenting, and whiteness.  Hence, a court is most likely
to recognize a functional parent if that person closely approxi-
mates the cultural archetype of the “normal” parent.
The squatter’s rights doctrines demonstrate that the institu-
tions of property, marriage, parenthood, and whiteness are fun-
damentally about communication and signaling to others—as
public institutions, clarity is required to signal one’s choice of le-
gal forms to third parties and the state.  The performative view
exposes these institutions as rituals imbued with social meanings,
performative in both the illocutionary and the perlocutionary
sense.  They are illocutionary insofar as they are inaugurated
with particular socially recognized rituals of ceremony or legal
formality, and perlocutionary insofar as they are repetitions of a
set of sedimented practices known to the community to consti-
tute property, marriage, parenthood, and whiteness.  A legal for-
malist would have thought that rights “vested” and became
metaphysically present upon the completion of these rituals.278
However, the theory of performativity fits better with Rose’s
277 See  Rose, supra  note 2, at 77-79 (describing property as speech). R
278 See supra  note 202 and accompanying text. R
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“consent theory” of property rights.  “Clear acts” are required to
put the community on notice of a claimant’s intent to appropriate
property, become married, or act as parent.279
The act of putting one’s name on a deed or title is an illocutio-
nary speech act that creates ownership.  Today, most transfers of
land require “a memorandum of sale” that “must, at a minimum,
be signed by the party to be bound, describe the real estate, and
state the price.”280  These illocutionary acts of legal formality can
be analogized to the ceremonial “livery of seisin” required to
transfer an estate before 1536.281  That ceremony required the
presence of the grantor, the grantee, and a witness.282  The gran-
tor transferred “seisin,” a type of possession, to the grantee “by
some symbolic act such as handing over a clod of dirt or putting
the grantee’s hand on the ring of the door and uttering such
words as ‘Know ye that I have given this land to [the
grantee].’”283  Adverse possession also demonstrates that prop-
erty is performative in the perlocutionary sense:  acting according
to the expectations of ownership is required.  This is not only for
adverse possessors, but also for original owners who will lose
their claims to land if they do not eject adverse possessors.
Likewise, marriage is performative in the illocutionary sense.
The ritualistic “I do” of the marriage ceremony is Austin’s para-
digm example.284  Butler writes, “The centrality of the marriage
ceremony in J.L. Austin’s examples of performativity suggests
that the heterosexualization of the social bond is the paradig-
matic form for those speech acts which bring about what they
name.  ‘I pronounce you . . .’ puts into effect the relation that it
names.”285  The required formalities of state certification, such as
the marriage license and solemnization, are similar forms of
speech signifying an intent to marry.286  Common law marriage
279 Rose, supra  note 2, at 77. R
280 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra  note 3, at 561-62.  Estoppel is recognized as an R
exception to the statute of frauds, where one person was induced to change her
position in reliance on an oral contract. Id.  at 562.  However, in a case of adverse
possession, there is no oral contract.
281 Id.  at 228.  Dukeminier and Krier point out that this “quaint” ceremony has
many modern analogues. Id.  at 228 n.25.
282 Id.  at 228.
283 Id.
284 AUSTIN, supra  note 263, at 5. R
285 Judith Butler, Critically Queer , 1 G.L.Q. 17, 17 (1993).
286 For example, to be married in New York State, a license is required “from a
town or city clerk.” N.Y. DOM. REL. § 13 (McKinney 1999).  Ceremonial solemniza-
tion is also necessary:  “the parties must solemnly declare in the presence of a clergy-
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demonstrates there are innumerable daily actions that couples
take that constitute “holding out” as married, actions with
perlocutionary effects.287
Parenthood can also be analyzed as performative.  The legal
documentation of a birth or adoption certificate naming the
child’s parents is an illocutionary ritual.  The child’s act of nam-
ing his or her “mother” and “father” is constitutive of the paren-
tal relation.  Functional parenthood exposes the institution of
parenthood as perlocutionary: acts of caretaking constitute
parenthood insofar as they signal to others the relationship of the
particular adult to the child.  Furthermore, an adult who does not
perform these acts is stripped of his or her rights as a parent.288
Whiteness is also amenable to analysis as performative.  Be-
cause whiteness was considered reputational property, a
performative utterance, such as George Looney’s reference to
the Spencer family as “God damned negroes,” was actionable
slander.289  Sharfstein describes a profound “shift from courts to
bureaucracy as custodians of the color line” during the early
twentieth century, at which time legal documentation, such as
“racial designations on birth, marriage, and death certificates,”
man or magistrate and the attending witness or witnesses that they take each other
as husband and wife.” Id.  § 12.
287 However, status and contract ideas still lurk in the statute books.  Even a sol-
emnized relationship may be annulled if one or both parties did not meaningfully
consent, or if they are unable or unwilling to “consummate” the marriage.  Grounds
for annulment include incapacity to contract because of insanity, physical incompe-
tence, fraud, duress, sham, bigamy, polygamy, incest, because the participants are of
the same sex, because they are underage, or because the marriage was entered into
in jest.  Steve Escalera, Part Four: Getting Divorced: California Marital Annul-
ments , 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 153, 156 (2000).  A marriage may be annulled
because either party was, “physically incapable of entering into the marriage state.”
CAL. FAM. CODE § 2210(f) (2003).  This language means a marriage is voidable if
one spouse is found physically incapable of sexual reproduction.  Stepanek v.
Stepanek, 14 Cal. Rptr. 793 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961).  The test for physical capacity
is not “fruitfulness,” but rather, ability to “copulate.” Id.  at 774.  Despite contract
language, contract logic cannot be the reason for this:  the California Supreme Court
held in Marvin v. Marvin  that a contract to perform sexual services is unenforceable.
557 P.2d 106, 112 (Cal. 1976).
288 “Courts find abandonment only when a parent has ‘consistently fail[ed], over a
substantial period of time, to communicate with the child, to support him, or to take
any real interest in him.’”  Carol Sanger, Separating from Children , 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 375, 421 (1996) (citation omitted).  Abandonment is grounds for termination of
all parental rights. Id.
289 Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1474 (quoting Appellee’s Brief at 5-9, Spencer v. R
Looney, 82 S.E. 745 (Va. 1914)).
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became the illocutionary moments of racial designation.290
Gross draws on Butler’s theory in order to conclude that “over
the course of the antebellum period, law made the ‘performance’
of whiteness increasingly important to the determination of racial
status.”291  “Doing the things a white man or woman did became
the law’s working definition of what it meant to be white.”292  By
acting out the legal rights and obligations of white masculinity, a
man laid claim to white status.  By acting out the moral and civic
obligations of white femininity, a woman similarly laid claim to
white status.  “To be white was to act white: to associate with
whites, to dance gracefully, to vote. Blood may have been the
signified, but the signifiers were social acts.”293  These perlocutio-
nary acts constituted whiteness.
This view of legal institutions as performative does not map
onto the formalist or the legal realist ideas.  The formalist idea of
preexisting natural status is akin to exactly the sort of determin-
ism explicitly rejected by performativity.  These doctrines cannot
be explained as formalist by the logic that “performance” here is
as a proxy for natural status.  If that were the case, the law would
not protect the bad-faith adverse possessor.  Status cannot be an-
alyzed apart from the legal discourse that creates it.  The
performative view of law creates a crisis for the idea that law
protects an underlying natural status.  Status is replaced with per-
formance, and that performance may not be in good faith.  Per-
formance raises the specters of fraud, deceit, and duplicity: a
thief masquerading as an owner, a gold digger masquerading as a
wife, a kidnapper masquerading as a parent, a slave masquerad-
ing as a free man.  We can only tell the difference if we have a
normative baseline.  Thus, these doctrines are focal points for
cultural debates over the meanings of socially contested legal in-
stitutions.  Why are long-term occupancy, cohabitation, caretak-
290 Id.  at 1507.  Sharfstein describes the efforts of state bureaucracies in Virginia
and Louisiana in the 1920s to “classify” citizens according to race in an effort to
maintain segregation. Id.  at 1506-07; see  Doe v. Louisiana, 479 So. 2d 369 (La. Ct.
App. 1985) (lawsuit brought to change racial designation on birth certificate from
“col.” to “white”).
291 Gross, supra  note 112, at 112; see also  John Tehranian, Performing Whiteness: R
Naturalization Litigation and the Construction of Racial Identity in America,  109
YALE L.J. 817 (2000).  Tehranian applies Butler’s theory in order to demonstrate
that “whiteness was determined through performance” in race determinations in
U.S. naturalization cases in the 1920s. Id.  at 820, 828.
292 Gross, supra  note 112, at 112. R
293 Id.  at 162-63.
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ing, and civic participation considered the core activities
constituting ownership, marriage, parenthood, and whiteness?
Neither does performativity square with the legal realist idea
of freely chosen contract.  Community agreement to tacitly en-
dorse a performance does not meet the legal standard for con-
tractual formation.294  Additionally, the performer cannot be
considered radically free: “Performativity is a matter of reiterat-
ing or repeating the norms by which one is constituted:  it is not a
radical fabrication of a gendered self.”295  Butler explains the
role of free choice in the context of gender performativity:
“Surely, there are nuanced and individual ways of doing  one’s
gender, but that  one does it, and that one does it in accord with
certain sanctions and proscriptions, is clearly not a fully individ-
ual matter.”296  Gender, and also race, are neither an individual
choice, nor are they fully inscribed on an individual by society,
culture, and history.  She explains that “actors are always already
on the stage, within the terms of the performance.”297  But to say
we are constructed is not to say we are programmed: “Construc-
tion is not opposed to agency; it is the necessary scene of agency,
the very terms in which agency is articulated and becomes cultur-
ally intelligible.”298  When property, marriage, and parenthood
no longer look like free contracts, normative questions are
brought to the surface.
The idea that “acting as if” is enough to confer legal recogni-
tion forces confrontation with questions about property, mar-
riage, parenthood, and segregation that are usually bracketed.  In
order to say whether or not someone is “acting as if,” courts must
define the exact contours of what it means to act as the archetyp-
ical owner, spouse, parent, white person, man, or woman.  As
observed by legal realists, this process is not merely descriptive
of what the archetype is ; this process inevitably involves norma-
tive judgments about what the archetype should  be.
Courts are generally resistant to outright declarations on
highly politicized normative questions.  Status-based formalism
provides a way to avoid engaging in normative debate through
obfuscation: normative premises are disguised as inscrutable doc-
294 See supra  Part II.B.
295 Butler, supra  note 285, at 22.
296 Butler, supra  note 256, at 525. R
297 Id.  at 526.
298 BUTLER, supra  note 255, at 147. R
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trinal or natural rights ideas.  Contract-based realism avoids
these questions through the rhetoric of volunteerism:  legal insti-
tutions are normative because everyone already agreed to the
relevant legal formality.
Both formalism and realism avoid normative questions with
appeals to “ruleness”: legal institutions are normative because
rules are essential to completeness, closure, success, and consen-
sus.  Legal formality provides a self-referential answer to ques-
tions regarding who is a legal owner, wife, parent, or white
person.  The owner is the person who excludes trespassers with
ejectment actions.  The wife is the woman who is listed as a de-
pendent on her husband’s tax return.  The parent is the person
who signs the consent form for the child to undergo surgery.  A
white man is someone who joins the military and votes.  These
claimants are engaged in a specific sort of mimicry: mimicry of
legally defined rights, duties, and formalities.  The network of le-
gal formalities creates the “realities” of ownership, marriage,
parenthood, and identity.
The theory of performativity can expose these normative ques-
tions through transparent parody.  Butler’s paradigm case of gen-
der norms is illustrative.  Gender norms are rigidly enforced—
confining in two related ways.  First, they impose expectations of
particular social roles on those defined as “men” or “women.”
Second, they purport to classify all of humanity into one category
or the other.  Butler examines gender as a historical strategy : “a
strategy of survival” for a culture that depends on two genders,
masculinity and femininity, to maintain its hegemony and trans-
mit its norms.299  Gender and sex hide their historical contin-
gency by appealing to origins in science, biology, or natural fact.
Gendered performances become compulsory and every repeti-
tion increases the credibility of the gender system: “[t]he authors
of gender become entranced by their own fictions whereby the
construction compels one’s belief in its necessity and natural-
ness.”300  Punishment is the result of choosing not to conform to
gender rules.  Ostracism is a cultural strategy: “those who fail to
perform their gender right are regularly punished.”301  The need
for gender classifications in the face of ambiguous natural/social
phenomena is reminiscent of the formalist impulse towards a
299 Butler, supra  note 256, at 522. R
300 Id.
301 Id.
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gapless system of total legal classification.  Butler writes,
“[d]iscrete genders are part of what ‘humanizes’ individuals
within contemporary culture.”302  Those who fail to meet the def-
inition of either man or woman, for example, the intersexual,
those born with both or neither male and female sexual organs,
are considered monstrous and inhuman, creatures that need to
be surgically “fixed” to meet the definition of either “man” or
“woman” for acceptance as human.303
However, there is room for resistance.  Parodic repetition of
gender norms is one way to disrupt their coherence, generating
anxiety for those with vested interests in the status quo.304  But-
ler asks, “[a]re there forms of repetition that do not constitute a
simple imitation, reproduction, and hence, consolidation of the
law . . . ?”305  When we see gender as performance, and not as a
substance that emanates from a natural, fixed, stable source, it is
possible to challenge dominant and hegemonic norms about how
gender should be enacted.  The result could be a proliferation of
gender performances.  The drag queen, for example, takes up
gendered scripts of femininity and applies them to a body that
has been called male.  The drag queen’s repetition of the scripts
of femininity is “incorrect.”306  Her mocking repetition calls into
question the very idea of an origin of gender.307  Repetition with-
out an original calls attention to the fact that repetitions of gen-
der have no originals.  Alternative gender performances open up
a space to reconceptualize dominant categories and provide
more freedom for identity.  In her later work, Butler turns from
the word “repetition” to “citation.”  Citation is a way of referring
back to a previous iteration, but it is a more open concept than
the idea of repetition, which implies that no change in patterns is
302 Id.
303 See SUZANNE J. KESSLER, LESSONS FROM THE INTERSEXUAL 12-32 (2000)
(describing the responses of parents and medical professionals to the births of inter-
sexual infants).
304 Butler’s philosophical poststructuralism gives rise to this sort of anxiety on a
broader level, insofar as she disputes the very idea of ontological grounding.  I need
not defend poststructuralism to make my point here about the lack of grounding for
particular legal institutions.
305 BUTLER, supra  note 255, at 31. R
306 Id.
307 Butler does not claim that all drag performances are necessarily subversive.
Butler, supra  note 256, at 527 (“[T]he sight of a transvestite onstage can compel R
pleasure and applause while the sight of the same transvestite on the seat next to us
on the bus can compel fear, rage, even violence.”).
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possible.308  Change is possible to the extent that citations lose
their compelling authority through parody.
III
CONSERVATIVE DIMENSIONS OF
PERFORMANCE REIFICATION
When the law acquiesces to a successful public performance
through doctrines such as adverse possession, does this create op-
portunities for parody of repressive social norms?  In a sense,
every legal form creates opportunities for parodic repetition—
citation to a doctrine in a new context can result in evolutionary
change to the doctrine itself.  But not every parody is likely to be
culturally intelligible and generate success in terms of wider cul-
tural uptake or acceptance within legal discourse.  The set of fe-
licity conditions that must be met are stringent.  The penalties for
failure are high.  As Robert Cover wrote, “[l]egal interpretation
takes place in a field of pain and death.”309  Those who are not
recognized as property owners may be imprisoned for theft.
Those who are not recognized as married are denied access to a
myriad of legal benefits.  Those who are not recognized as par-
ents may be cut off from contact with their children.  Under slav-
ery, those who were not recognized as white may have been
forced into servitude.
The performance reification doctrines generate chances for
repetition and subversion of both status-based identity categories
and legal classifications.  By allowing a person who has black an-
cestry the rights of a white person, the law subverts the idea that
race is carried through “blood.”  By recognizing a mother who is
neither biologically related to a child, nor an adoptive parent, the
legal doctrine of functional parenthood undermines the privi-
leged status of the state in determining who is or is not a parent.
Alternatively, the law could be containing potentially subversive
social phenomena, such as the cohabitating couple, by bringing
them within the ambit of its classificatory schemes.
Dubler points out that a copy either pays homage to the legal
form or subverts it through parody.310  Acts of homage are likely
to be recognized by the law, parodies denied.  Although at first
glance they may appear to present opportunities for parody of
308 BUTLER, supra  note 267, at 13. R
309 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the World , 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
310 Dubler, supra  note 29, at 1008.
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conventional norms, doctrines such as adverse possession are
structured in order to avoid disruption of conventional norms.
Those marginal social actors who attempt to utilize these doc-
trines are required to reproduce conventions in order to gain rec-
ognition as bearers of legal rights.  They must cite to convention,
and as those citations accumulate, the normative force of that
convention builds.  Thus, by holding herself out as a conventional
property owner, the adverse possessor contributes the sedimen-
tation of convention into the edifice of the institution of prop-
erty.  Such a strategy does little to challenge the privileged status
of an institution or to disrupt the status quo allocation of
entitlements.
Katherine Franke’s study of slave marriages demonstrates the
ways in which legal recognition of “outlier” phenomena can be
profoundly conservative.311  Franke analyzes the effects of the
right to marry being granted to newly freed slaves in the late
nineteenth century.  Franke’s review of primary archival sources
demonstrates that “African Americans emerged out of slavery
accustomed to forming a spectrum of culturally sanctioned inti-
mate adult relationships.”312  However, in the postbellum period,
Southern-state bureaucracies became concerned with ensuring
that African-American women and children did not become de-
pendent on the public fisc.313  Legitimizing African-American
marriages was one way to privatize dependence—so long as
freedmen were forced to support their wives and children.  Thus,
postbellum Southern states undertook “robust enforcement of
bigamy, fornication, and adultery laws” that “served to domesti-
cate African American people who were either unaware of, or
ignored, the formal requirements of marital formation and disso-
lution, or who chose to conduct their intimate sexual relation-
ships in ways that fell outside the matrimonial norms of Victorian
society.”314
Through the institution of marriage, African Americans “were
transformed in subtle and not so subtle ways into the kinds of
citizens upon which southern society depended at that time.”315
This “paradox of legal recognition and regulation” draws “into
311 See  Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation
of African American Marriages , 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251 (1999).
312 Id.  at 273.
313 Id.  at 299-303.
314 Id.  at 256-57.
315 Id.  at 255.
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question the fiction of a rights discourse that fixes as victory par-
ticipation in institutions such as marriage.”316  However, Franke
does not  extol the abandonment of rights-based struggles.
Rather, she concludes that any social movement that demands
institutional access must “be accompanied by a critique of the
institution to which access is being sought,” which includes “an
analysis of the way in which the state always retains the power to
manipulate participation in an institution in ways that may be at
odds with the interests of the rights holders.”317
Doctrines of performance reification provide institutional ac-
cess to otherwise excluded social groups and individuals.  How-
ever, in each case, the state retains the power to manipulate
participation in ways that may be more conservative than subver-
sive, thereby entrenching confining social norms rather than cre-
ating opportunities for parody.  “Beneficiaries” of these
doctrines must therefore tread with caution.  In each case of per-
formance reification, the driving force behind the law is protec-
tion of third-party and public interests.  These interests dictate
that community norms be preserved—a conservative proposi-
tion.  Thus, despite the fact that doctrines of performance reifica-
tion expose the normative foundations of property, marriage,
parenthood, and identity as socially constructed, those doctrines
nonetheless entrench the power of status quo baselines and bol-
ster formalist/realist attempts to create a gapless web of concepts
to mold and channel social life.
A. Property Law
Adverse possession is fundamentally a conservative doctrine,
in two ways: first, by uncritically imposing pro-development
norms of land ownership; and second, by eliminating the chance
for persons to have any legitimate relation to land other than
“sole and despotic dominion.”318
The performative model reveals that adverse possession is
about the repetition of norms of property ownership: courts ask,
how would a reasonable owner of land behave?  At a bare mini-
mum, occupancy of the land is required—but what does occu-
pancy entail?  The Locke/Blackstone idea of property dictates
that acting like an owner means putting labor into the land.  John
316 Id.  at 253.
317 Id.  at 308-09.
318 See BLACKSTONE, supra  note 221, at *2.
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Sprankling surveyed hundreds of post-1950 adverse possession
cases and concluded that they display a “prodevelopment
bias.”319  Courts construe imitating the “reasonable owner” to
mean utilizing the land for economic purposes.  Indeed, “courts
have . . . found the following activities sufficient for ‘actual pos-
session’: fishing, harvesting natural hay, seasonal stock grazing,
cutting small amounts of timber and gathering firewood.”320
However, “acts characteristic of an environmentally-conscious
owner, such as camping or other non-economic visits, fail to con-
stitute the possession necessary to defeat exclusivity.”321
The very idea that adverse possession requires occupancy ex-
cludes the claims of “preservationist owners, such as conserva-
tion organizations, land trusts and other private owners who . . .
may affirmatively minimize or avoid visitation.  The presence of
humans on such lands is ultimately inconsistent with complete
preservation.”322  Sprankling’s fears reflect commodification anx-
iety: “[w]ild lands are valued only for the material wealth that
they can provide to humanity in the short term.  Accordingly, a
wild land tract is considered a commodity, as fungible and mun-
dane as an automobile, a pencil or an orange, destined for con-
sumption.”323  Sprankling’s response is to propose limits on the
doctrine of adverse possession.324
But the performative view of law suggests that adverse posses-
sion may provide opportunities for parody of norms about land
usage in addition to mere uncritical repetition.325  An effective
319 See  Sprankling, supra  note 11, at 832-33. See also  William G. Ackerman & R
Shane T. Johnson, Outlaws of the Past: A Western Perspective on Prescription and
Adverse Possession,  31 LAND & WATER L. REV. 79, 79 (1996) (arguing that adverse
possession should be abolished “because current public policy prefers land and re-
source preservation versus exploitation”).
320 Sprankling, supra  note 11, at 832 (citations omitted). R
321 Id. at 838 (citations omitted).
322 See id.  at 839.
323 Id.  at 856-57.
324 He argues for an “exemption of privately-owned wild lands from adverse pos-
session.” Id . at 863.  Sprankling’s argument casts adverse possession as a formalist
doctrine with roots in the common law.  He argues that the requirements of notori-
ety, acquiescence, and the passage of time do not play a large role in cases involving
wild lands. Id.  at 821.  Sprankling also discusses the policy arguments behind ad-
verse possession, including the coherence of the title system, and concludes that they
are less salient to the context of wild lands. Id . at 873-85.  His response to the argu-
ments about reliance interests is to assert a normative notion of ownership:  owner-
ship means following the rules and acquiring formal legalities such as title—third
parties should know to do good title searches. Id.  at 883.
325 However, adverse possession is more often used to defeat novel approaches to
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parody might be an adverse possession case brought on behalf of
conservationists, arguing that their efforts to preserve wild lands
constituted “acting as if” they owned the land.326  My research
yields no evidence of a successful claim of this nature, although
similar claims have been brought.327  In the Alaska case Nome
2000 v. Fagerstrom , the court held that “use of trails and picking
up of litter, although perhaps indicative of adverse use, would
not provide the reasonably diligent owner with visible evidence
of another’s exercise of dominion and control.”328  The court
noted that the adverse possessor’s attempts to mark the bounda-
ries of their claims with stakes were insufficiently clear signals of
ownership.329  It remains to be seen if a court would accept a
claim of adverse possession by a conservationist who undertook
conservation activities on the land, posted clear notice of the
boundaries of the claim, and ejected trespassers.
A second conservative dimension of adverse possession is the
doctrine’s contribution to the legal systematization of all rela-
tions to land under the rubric of ownership.  By clearing title,
adverse possession serves a crucial role in the smooth functioning
of any system of land ownership.330  The aspiration of the title
system of property ownership is the formalist aspiration of a
conservation, such as conservation easements.  John L. Hollingshead, Conservation
Easements: A Flexible Tool for Land Preservation , 3 ENVTL. LAW. 319, 328-29
(1997).  Conservation easements allow landowners to sell their property with spe-
cific contractual provisions prohibiting certain forms of development. See UNIF.
CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 163 (1981) (establishing tax benefits for
landowners who convey lands with conservation easements).
326 There is a growing movement by conservationists to buy up wild lands for
protection. See  The Nature Conservancy, at  http://nature.org/; Trust for Public
Land, at  http://www.tpl.org/.
327 For example, in Estate of Welliver by Welliver v. Alberts , the Wellivers main-
tained trails throughout the forest, which they used for “walking, horseback riding,
cycling, and snowmobiling, and the ‘woods’ for camping.”  663 N.E.2d 1094, 1096
(Ill. App. Ct. 1996).  The court noted that “the plaintiffs presented testimony that,
following Ed Welliver’s death, they spread his ashes throughout the woodland
trails.” Id.  Nonetheless, the court held that the actual ownership must still be more
than “mere mental enclosure.” Id . at 1099.  Additionally, the court asserted that “it
is well established that use of vacant, or wild and undeveloped and unoccupied land
is presumed to be permissive and not adverse.” Id.  However, the requirement that
adverse possession be aggressively adverse is not established precedent in the
United States. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra  note 3, at 133 (explaining that some R
sources assert that the dominant view is that the adverse possessor’s state of mind is
irrelevant, while others suggest a good-faith standard).
328 799 P.2d 304, 311 (Alaska 1990).
329 Id.
330 See supra  Part I.A.2.
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gapless grid.  The 1785 Continental Congress sought to survey all
lands in the public domain, following Thomas Jefferson’s “gridi-
ron plan of development”:
Jefferson thought that a rectangular survey was easy to lay
out, comprehensible by unsophisticated settlers, and, like ge-
ometry, a thing of beauty.  In addition, the imposition of a for-
mal rectilinear order on the wilderness served social purposes.
It encouraged division of land into small uniform tracts, which
could be—and were—given to soldiers who had fought in the
continental army.331
In the United States today, there is no terra nullius ; every tract
of land has an owner: “in every American state, statutes provide
for land title records to be maintained by the county recorder (or
other equivalent public official) in each county.”332  These in-
dexes are organized spatially, tract by tract, where feasible, but
more often temporally, creating a “chain of title” from the pre-
sent owner back to the first owner.333  If no private owner holds
title, title is held by the local, state, or federal government.334
The title recording system in the United States is highly devel-
oped; indeed, private insurance companies sell title insurance to
land purchasers.  Because of this, “security of title in the United
States ought to be, and is, very high.”335
The purpose of the gapless title system is economic.  Law and
economics scholars argue that the system avoids costly disputes
over land ownership, facilitates greater marketability, and avoids
the potential tragedy-of-the-commons effect.336  It also reflects
an aesthetic preference for formal rectilinear order.  In the
American colonial imaginary, wilderness was “instinctively un-
derstood as something alien to man—an insecure and uncomfort-
able environment against which civilization had waged an
unceasing struggle . . . . Its dark, mysterious qualities made it a
setting in which the prescientific imagination could place a swarm
of demons and spirits.”337
331 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra  note 3, at 665 n.3. R
332 Id.  at 652.
333 Id.  at 653.  The tract method is not used in most states because land has not
been subdivided into identifiable parcels. Id.
334 Id.
335 Id.  at 651.
336 See, e.g. , Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights,  57 AM. ECON.
REV. PA. & PROC. 347 (1967).
337 RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND 8 (4th ed. 2001).
This view is culturally specific.  Rose explains:
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Likewise, Henry David Thoreau’s statement that “in Wildness
is the preservation of the world” can be read as more than a pref-
erence for undisturbed nature, but rather, a critique of the mod-
ern impulse towards classification, management, and control as
the human relationship to land.338  Federal Indian law today con-
tinues to be an exception to the neat gridlike formalist divisions
of the title system.339  It takes a stretch of the imagination to con-
jure terra nullius  today: perhaps the emergence of a volcanic is-
land in the middle of the ocean.340  Even outer space and
Antarctica are governed by formal treaties.341  Imagine a hypo-
thetical strip of forest with an ancient title in a community of
conservationists that has long enjoyed the land as a wild pre-
serve.  If they wish to prevent “adverse possessors” from turning
the forest into a Wal-Mart parking lot, they must establish their
own claim to ownership through adverse possession.  Wildness is
not an option.
However, adverse possession may also have a subversive ele-
ment, undermining the pro-development and totalizing classifica-
tory ambitions of property law.  The performative view of
adverse possession allows for the possibility that adverse posses-
At least some Indians . . . prided themselves on not marking the land but
rather on moving lightly through it . . . . The doctrine of first possession . . .
reflects the attitude that human beings are outsiders to nature.  It gives the
earth and its creatures over to those who mark them so clearly as to trans-
form them, so that no one else will mistake them for unsubdued nature.
Rose, supra  note 2, at 87-88.  Ironically, this argument has been attempted as a R
means to prevent Native Americans from making out a claim for adverse possession.
In Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom , the plaintiff and titular owner, Nome 2000, brought an
action to eject Charles Fagerstrom, a Native American.  799 P.2d 304, 308 (Alaska
1990).  Nome 2000 presented expert testimony from an anthropologist that “the
traditional Native system does not recognize exclusive ownership of land,” but
rather, only “stewardship” of nature. Id .  Thus, following the crude essentialist
logic, as a Native American, Fagerstrom could not have intended to possess the land
under a claim of right.  This, despite Fagerstrom’s insistence that he “‘frown[ed]’
upon people camping on ‘my property.’” Id.  at 308 n.5.
338 Henry David Thoreau, Walking , in EXCURSIONS, THE WRITINGS OF HENRY
DAVID THOREAU 275 (Riverside ed., Ticknor & Fields 1863); Jack Turner, In Wild-
ness Is the Preservation of the World, in DEEP ECOLOGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 331
(George Sessions ed., 1995); see also  Thomas Birch, The Incarceration of Wildness:
Wilderness Areas as Prisons, in DEEP ECOLOGY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 339
(George Sessions ed., 1995).
339 See, e.g. , Joseph William Singer, Sovereignty and Property , 86 NW. U. L. REV.
1, 7 (1991) (arguing that Federal Indian law is “an entryway to understanding the
complex relations between property and sovereign power in United States law”).
340 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra  note 3, at 12. R
341 Id.
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sion may reward fraudulent performance—a parody that under-
mines the original notion of property ownership.  Instead of a
standard of subjective mental intent, the doctrine of adverse pos-
session has the requirements of notoriety and acquiescence from
the community: presumably if the claimant’s possession is illegiti-
mate, the true owner will attempt to eject her, or the community
will refuse to act in reliance on her ownership.  The test is merely
whether or not the claimant’s act of communication is successful
as a performative act.342  Legal status is granted to a successful
performance, regardless of the performer’s authenticity by other
normative measures.
This mimicry exposes that on a broader scale, the normative
foundation of the system of property ownership is a tenuous set
of social agreements.  Rose explains:
At the outset of private property, people have to cooperate to
set up the system—they have to get themselves organized, go
to the meetings, discuss the options, figure out who gets what
and how the entitlements will be protected . . . .  And indeed,
even after a property regime is in place, people have to respect
each other’s individual entitlements out of cooperative im-
pulses, because it is impossible to have a continuous system of
policing and/or retaliation for cheating.  Thus a property sys-
tem depends on people not stealing, cheating, and so forth,
even when they have the chance.343
“Ownership anxiety” comes from the realization that the prop-
erty system merely is “the agreement among men legalizing what
each had already grabbed.”344
Rose argues that the responses to ownership anxiety are for-
malism and legal realism: “the comfortable notion that existing
distributions of property are justified simply because they are in-
tricately detailed and interrelated, or because the general institu-
tion of property may happen to be a useful one.”345  Some critical
scholars elect to confront ownership anxiety head-on, arguing:
[A]ny particular property right has no firm foundation and is
still subject to the claims of all humankind.  In turn, all human-
kind may have something to say about the way you use your
342 See supra  Part I.A.2.
343 CAROL M. ROSE, PROPERTY AND PERSUASION:  ESSAYS ON THE HISTORY,
THEORY, AND RHETORIC OF OWNERSHIP 37 (1994).
344 SCHLATTER, supra note 26, at 130-31 (“[T]he normative case for first posses-
sion – its force as a justification – is commonly thought to be rather weak.”);
DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra  note 3, at 15. R
345 Rose, supra  note 17, at 613. R
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property . . . .  [P]roperty is a social construction and a product
of law, a way to get at some larger social goals, of which, of
course, redistribution may be one.346
Insofar as actual cases of adverse possession tend to reward
the good-faith adverse possessor over the bad-faith one, assist
the wealthy in taking land from unwilling sellers, or serve the
function of clearing title on ancient claims, the doctrine is not
only a repetition but a critical piece of the system of property
ownership and its reproduction of the existing distribution of re-
sources.  There seems to be very little support for wholesale
deconstruction of this property rights regime.347  But adverse
possession law itself may provide the potential for smaller-scale
redistributive deconstructions.  Seth Borgos describes squatting
as the “time-hallowed response of the landless to the contradic-
tion between their own impoverishment and a surfeit of unu-
tilized property.”348  One commentator suggests that in the
context of homeless persons, “property theories provide a means
to argue for recognition of limited property interests in aban-
doned or government-owned buildings based on both economic
utility and a squatter’s personal identification with the prop-
erty.”349  Even though their legal claims of adverse possession
may not be successful, “squatting has proven to be an effective
tool for the homeless, not only in the direct manner of producing
low-income housing, but also as a means of mobilizing public
opinion.”350
346 Id.  at 628-29.  Rose cites many examples of scholarship calling for redistribu-
tion in this vein, including Reich’s The New Property , arguing for redistribution be-
cause subsistence rights are required for political participation, and Singer’s
Sovereignty and Property , arguing for reconceptualization of property rights of Na-
tive Americans. Id.  (citing Charles A. Reich, The New Property , 73 YALE L.J. 733,
785-86 (1964)); Singer, supra  note 339, at 5-6. R
347 Anthropologist George Marcus explains, “[t]here appears to be no real or
powerfully imagined ‘outside’ to capitalism now, and where oppositional space is to
be found, or how it is to be constructed within a global economy, is perhaps the most
important fin-de-sie´cle question of left-liberal thought.”  George Marcus, Introduc-
tion to the Volume and Reintroduction to the Series, in CONNECTED:  ENGAGEMENTS
WITH MEDIA 6 (1996).
348 Seth Borgos, Low-Income Homeownership and the ACORN Squatters Cam-
paign , in CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING 428, 429 (Rachel G. Bratt, Chester
Hartman & Ann Meyerson eds., 1986).
349 David L. Rosendorf, Homelessness and the Uses of Theory:  An Analysis of
Economic and Personality Theories of Property in the Context of Voting Rights and
Squatting Rights , 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 701, 722 (1990-1991).
350 Id.  at 724.
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B. Family Law
1. Marriage
Like adverse possession, common law marriage has more con-
servative than subversive potential.  The conservative aspects of
the doctrine can be subdivided into two sorts: (1) those based on
certain normative assumptions behind what acting like a married
couple means, and (2) those based on the totalizing classifica-
tions of marriage law itself.  In examining common law marriage,
courts ask how married couples are expected to behave in our
society.  David Caudill has noted that “common law marriage
may actually reinforce the institution of marriage by its focus on
the essence of a relationship.”351  The bare minimum require-
ment is cohabitation—but that will not suffice.  Courts may en-
force a number of confining social expectations when attempting
to determine if a couple was “acting married.”  For example, no-
tions of sexual fidelity were relevant to the court in In re Estate of
Marden .352  Good plaintiffs are those whose relationships con-
formed to the standards of “a most conventional, respectable and
ordinary family life.”353
In these cases, gender norms tend to crop up in the form of
man as breadwinner and woman as homemaker.  Dubler argues
that “the doctrine of common law marriage provided jurists a
tool with which to define the proper relationship between wo-
men, their potential male providers, and the state.”354  Paula Et-
telbrick describes:  “[s]teeped in a patriarchal system that looks
to ownership, property, and dominance of men over women as its
basis, the institution of marriage has long been the focus of radi-
cal-feminist revulsion.”355  This is despite the shift from status to
contract in marriage law.356  Reva Siegel argues that between the
Civil War and the New Deal, courts shifted from the presumption
that the married husband had the right to all of the products of
351 David S. Caudill, Legal Recognition of Unmarried Cohabitation: A Proposal
to Update and Reconsider Common-Law Marriage , 49 TENN. L. REV. 537, 563
(1982).
352 See supra  Part I.B.1.
353 Hewitt v. Hewitt, 380 N.E.2d 454, 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978), rev’d,  394 N.E.2d
1204 (Ill. 1979).
354 Dubler, supra  note 58, at 1886. R
355 Paula Ettelbrick, Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation? , OUT/LOOK
NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, partially reprinted in  SAME-SEX MARRIAGE:
PRO AND CON 118, 119 (Andrew Sullivan, ed. 1997).
356 Siegel, supra  note 220, at 2130. R
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-2\ORE205.txt unknown Seq: 69 18-NOV-05 13:17
Adverse Possession of Identity 631
his wife’s labor to the presumption that a wife only owed her
husband “the household labor she performed raising, clothing,
feeding, educating, and nurturing her family.”357  Siegel argues
that in doing so, “courts reformulated a putatively feudal body of
status law so that the doctrine of marital service imposed upon
the wife the duty to perform such work as is necessary to
reproduce the labor force in a modern industrial economy.”358
However, recent court decisions on common law marriage
make different assumptions about what it means to “act mar-
ried.”359  The contemporary marriage ideal has been profoundly
influenced by the women’s movement, with its emphasis on
equality in marriage.  Norms for “wifely behavior,” such as tak-
ing the husband’s last name and providing domestic services in
exchange for financial support, are no longer so compulsory.360
In most community property states, husbands are no longer enti-
tled to be the sole managers of community property.361
The norm of “companionate marriage” reflects this influence.
Mary Ann Glendon describes companionate marriage as the
quest for personal happiness, “prompted by mutual attraction
and interests [and desire for] close parent-child relationships.”362
Modern commentators describe the marital “contract” in emo-
tional terms, such as the “goal of maintaining a caring, coopera-
tive relationship” and “the normative goals of mutual
commitment and relational stability.”363
Legal professionals do not want to be in the business of exam-
ining evidence of emotional sorts.364  In its place, the law turns to
357 Id .
358 Id .
359 Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law,  1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1458-
59 (1992).
360 Id.
361 Id.  at 1459.
362 MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 14 (1981).
363 Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as a Relational Contract,  84
VA. L. REV. 1225, 1230-31 (1998).
364 See, e.g. , id.  at 1230 (“Law’s domain is the area beyond the boundaries of
social and relational norms.”).  This view is based on the legal preference for objec-
tive over subjective standards, efficiency arguments about social norms, and con-
cerns based on privacy or autonomy such as the fear that “rights talk” pollutes
intimate relations. But see  Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y.
1989) (recognizing a gay couple as a “family” based on “the totality of the relation-
ship as evidenced by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the parties”).  How-
ever, as evidence of this subjective mental state, the court examined objective
formalities, such as Braschi’s driver’s license and passport, safe deposit boxes, bank
accounts, credit cards, medical documents, and life insurance. Id.  In a move paral-
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the familiar: bureaucratic formalities. Wagner  suggests that
courts in common law marriage cases today are most concerned
with whether or not the couple mimicked the legal formalities of
marriage, examining income tax returns, bank accounts, and em-
ployment records.365
Certain feminists have argued for common law marriage based
on the failure  of companionate marriage norms to create equal-
ity.  Siegel argues that the ideal of companionate marriage masks
the economic value of work in the home under the rubric of inti-
macy:  “[u]nder this regime of judicially enforced ‘altruism,’ ex-
change relations in the family could not be formalized at law.”366
Joan Williams argues that this state of affairs continues to the
present day:
The problem is that women’s work does not get translated into
entitlements because the law delivers their earnings ‘into the
hands of manhood.’  Under the common law that delivery was
formal and explicit . . .  Today the relevant law is in the divorce
courts . . .  [F]irst mothers are marginalized to enable fathers
to perform as ideal workers while the children are raised ac-
cording to the norm of parental care . . . Then, upon divorce,
courts treat the ideal-worker’s wage as his sole personal
property.367
The presumption remains that marriage is an economic rela-
tionship, requiring pooled resources and a shared household.
This presumption fits with the modern feminist goal of common
law marriage: to ensure financial support for women who estab-
lish common households with men in which they play the home-
maker role.368  This particular feminist argument, while it may
secure rights for individual women, also participates in the male-
as-breadwinner-female-as-homemaker model of marriage.  Such
an argument is unlikely to subvert the work and family norms
that contribute to the root of the problem.
Common law marriage is also conservative insofar as it rein-
forces the role of the state in classifying intimate relationships.
leling the common-law-marriage context, the court also examined how the couple
held themselves out as spouses to the public. Id.; see  Dubler, supra  note 29, at 1015-
22 (discussing Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co.).
365 See supra  Part I.B.1.
366 Siegel, supra  note 220, at 2131. R
367 WILLIAMS, supra  note 104, at 115. R
368 See  Bowman, supra  note 30, at 755 (“The nonrecognition of common law mar- R
riage often results in what appear to be substantial injustices to women who are
especially vulnerable.”).
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Common law marriage takes relationships without legal formali-
ties and official solemnization and relabels them as marriage.
This impulse is akin to the classificatory aims of formalist juris-
prudence:  an attempt to bring order to ambiguous social phe-
nomena, the imposition of the grid onto wildness.  Common law
marriage allows the state to ensure the hegemony of the marital
form as the predominant mode of social ordering of intimate re-
lations.  Bringing “nonmarital forms of domestic ordering and
solemnized marriage . . . within the legal confines of marriage”
enables regulation.369
However, common law marriage could be a threat to the
state’s regulatory role by removing incentives for marriage for-
malization.  Like the title system, the state system of marriage
registration enables a number of policies.370  For example, some
states have furthered alleged public health goals by requiring
HIV testing as a condition for obtaining a marriage license.371
Common law marriage evades this policy.  Florida provides a
marriage license discount to anyone who has taken a state certi-
fied “premarital preparation course.”372  Marriage is also a way
for the state to identify a domestic unit for income taxes, default
property rights upon death or dissolution of the relationship,
health care decision-making, and social security benefits.  To the
extent that common law spouses imitate these legal formalities
and receive recognition as married, they bolster the state’s for-
mal role as the arbiter of domestic relations.
Can the institution of marriage be successfully parodied
through common law marriage?  The debate over gay marriage
provides helpful insights.  Some theorists argue that “marriage
between men or between women could . . . destabilize the cul-
tural meaning of marriage.”373  Gay marriage defies the defini-
tion of marriage as a union between a man and a woman,
exposing it as culturally specific and hence changeable.  How-
ever, many queer theorists are not enthused about the subversive
369 Dubler, supra  note 29, at 1011.
370 See  Caudill, supra  note 351, at 558 (describing how legal formalities of mar- R
riage further the “state’s interest in keeping records”).
371 See  Michael Closen, Robert Gamrath, & Dem Hopkins, Mandatory Premarital
HIV Testing: Political Exploitation of the AIDS Epidemic , 69 TUL. L. REV. 71
(1994).
372 FLA. STAT. § 741.01(5) (2002).
373 Nan Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry,  1 LAW & SEXU-
ALITY 9, 17 (1991).
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potential of gay marriage.  What is parodied is the normative sta-
tus of heterosexuality, not marriage as an institution.  Butler ar-
gues, “the bid to gain access to certain kinds of rights and
entitlements that are secured by marriage by petitioning for en-
trance into the institution does not consider the alternative: to
ask for a delinking of precisely those rights and entitlements
from the institution of marriage itself.”374  Likewise, Michael
Warner argues that gay marriage merely supports the ability of
the state to “regulate the sexual lives of those who do not
marry.”375  He also exhibits anxiety about classification of do-
mestic relationships by the state, arguing that many queers “have
an astonishing range of intimacies.  Most have no labels.”376  Et-
telbrick similarly argues that:
[M]arriage will not liberate us as lesbians and gay men.  In
fact, it will constrain us, make us more invisible, force our as-
similation into the mainstream . . . attaining the right to marry
will not transform our society from one that makes narrow,
but dramatic, distinctions between those who are married and
those who are not married to one that respects and encourages
choice of relationships and family diversity.377
Franke argues that the best response to this situation is refusal
altogether: “the best strategy to undermine the privileged status
of marriage . . . is not to admit same-sex couples into the institu-
tion . . . but rather to give heterosexual couples a way to opt
out.”378  Butler argues that this sort of refusal is congruent with
the theory of performativity: “there is, I believe, a performativity
proper to refusal which, in this instance, insists upon the reitera-
tion of sexuality beyond the dominant terms.”379
If the problem is the role of the state in marriage, can a com-
mon law marriage serve as an effective parody?  Warner argues
that common law marriage supports his historical argument that
“[c]ountless systems of marriage have had nothing to do with a
374 Judith Butler, Competing Universalities, in CONTINGENCY, HEGEMONY,
UNIVERSALITY:  CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUES ON THE LEFT, 136, 176 (Judith Butler,
Ernesto Laclau & Slavoj _i_ek eds., 2000); see also MICHAEL WARNER, THE
TROUBLE WITH NORMAL 121 (1999) (arguing that gay marriage would only further
“bundle” marriage with social entitlements such as income tax advantages, public
assistance, and community property laws).
375 WARNER, supra note 374, at 96.
376 Id.  at 116.
377 Ettelbrick, supra  note 355, at 119-20. R
378 Katherine M. Franke, Letter to the Editor, Le Marriage: Vows, Redefined ,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2000.
379 Butler, supra  note 374, at 176-77. R
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state fetish or with the regulatory force of law.”380  Thus, com-
mon law marriage exposes that the core of marriage is not de
jure but de facto.  He argues that the problem with those who
support gay marriage is that they take for granted the constitu-
tive role of the state.381  Warner concedes, however, that the
common law approach may have many of the same limitations as
traditional marriage.382  Insofar as common law marriage is itself
defined by statute and legal precedent, it seems to be a stretch to
call it a parody of legal formality.  Indeed, in the popular imagi-
nary, common law marriage is cohabitation for at least seven
years—a formulation derived from what is assumed to be the le-
gal statute of limitations.
Dubler tells the stories of marriage dissenters forced to define
their relationships as “common law marriage” to avoid criminal-
ization.  She provides the example of Lillian Harman and Edwin
C. Walker.  Believing marriage to be a strictly private affair, the
couple entered into a “civil compact” in 1886.383  Walker stated
that their arrangement was designed to avoid “so-called ‘marital
rights’ with which this public acknowledgment of our relationship
may invest me.”384  The couple was prosecuted under the state’s
cohabitation laws, and the court held that even if their union was
a common law marriage, they could be punished because “[s]tate
marriage regulations . . . serve the critical purpose of ‘giv[ing]
publicity to a contract which is of deep concern to the public.’”385
The court saw the union between Harman and Walker as a par-
ody of marriage and refused to enforce it.
These fears of common law marriage as parody tap into even
deeper anxieties about the instability of the privileged status of
marriage in U.S. society.  Thus, common law marriage “revealed
that there was, perhaps, little difference between common law
marriages and solemnized marriages . . .  The process of mimesis,
in other words, may reveal that the institution being mimicked is
no more stable or real than the mimetic result.”386  Dubler ar-
gues that defense of marriage as an institution at the center of
the social order was another reason for the movement to abolish
380 WARNER, supra  note 374, at 124.
381 Id.
382 Id.
383 Dubler, supra  note 29, at 958 (citing State v. Walker, 13 P. 279 (Kan. 1887)).
384 Id.  at 959 (citing Walker , 13 P. at 281).
385 Id.  (citing Walker , 13 P. at 286).
386 Id.  at 1008-09.
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common law marriage: “[t]he hallowed institution . . . emerged as
hollow . . . To preserve marriage, therefore, the parody had to be
eliminated.”387  Many defenders of traditional marriage today ex-
hibit this logic, arguing that a shift to “postmodernity,” defined
as moral relativism, is the problem.388  Others criticize the de
facto view of marriage as making marriage a mere private “lifes-
tyle choice,” as opposed to a public commitment central to the
social order.389
2. Parenthood
Although functional parenthood is a relatively recent legal
concept, due to its structural similarities to adverse possession
and common law marriage, advocates of progressive social
change should approach it with caution.  Functional parenthood
may have profoundly conservative implications.
In contrast to the other doctrines, which do not explicitly lay
out the core types of behaviors that constitute ownership and
married life, the ALI is explicit with respect to functional
parenthood.  The ALI definition of functional parenthood pro-
vides a nonexclusive, eight paragraph list of activities that implic-
itly form the normative core of their vision of parenting.390  The
list ranges from the quotidian (managing the child’s bedtime) to
the lofty (providing moral and ethical guidance).391  It includes
arranging for the child’s safety, health, education, and discipline,
as well as helping the child to develop physical and social
skills.392
Caretaking need not be direct contact with the child; it can
involve taking responsibility to “direct, arrange, and supervise
387 Id.  at 1009.
388 See, e.g. , GLENN T. STANTON, WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS:  REASONS TO BE-
LIEVE IN MARRIAGE IN A POSTMODERN SOCIETY 34 (1997); LINDA J. WAITE &
MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE:  WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE
HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY 3 (2000) (lamenting the
move towards a “postmarriage culture”).
389 See  Ellen Kandoian, Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility
of a Shared Moral Life , 75 GEO. L.J. 1829, 1832 (1987) (“The de facto view, in
contrast, focuses on the way of life.”); WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra  note 388, at 6 R
(“The single most dangerous myth . . . is the idea that marriage—or divorce—is, can
be, or should be, just another lifestyle choice.”).
390 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, § 2.03(5).  Oregon’s law includes a similar list R
in its definition of a person who has established a “child-parent” relationship. See
supra  text accompanying note 73. R
391 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, § 2.03(5).
392 Id.
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the interaction and care provided by others.”393  The ALI defini-
tion also includes the open-ended category of “parenting func-
tions” that include “performing any other functions that are
customarily performed by a parent or guardian and that are im-
portant to a child’s welfare and development.”394
Some features of this list have conservative effects.  Martha
Fineman writes, “[b]ecause the legally constructed image of the
family expresses what is appropriately considered family, it also
constitutes the normal and defines the deviant.”395  Indeed, those
who do not perform the caretaking tasks mentioned above may
find themselves in court disputing the claims of de facto par-
ents.396  The definition is premised on certain highly specific con-
temporary assumptions about child development.397  For
example, the assumption that parents should be “providing disci-
pline” by “assigning and supervising chores” is controversial.398
Some parenting experts eschew the rhetoric of “chores.”399
Frank Catania suggests that the basis for the ALI list is a social
norm about parenting, in which, in the words of Elizabeth Scott:
“[t]he value of children in a life plan is both basic and complex; it
derives from a desire to pass on a cultural and personal heritage,
to instill values, skills, and interests, and to enjoy the companion-
393 Id.
394 Id.  § 2.03(6).
395 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Neutered Mother , 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 653,
662 (1992).
396 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, § 2.03(1)(c)(ii).  A de facto parent can sue as a R
result of the “complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform caretaking
functions.” Id.  Furthermore, the ALI Principles allocate custody rights upon di-
vorce according to the proportion of caretaking tasks and parental responsibilities
undertaken by each parent. Id . at I8.
397 This reflects an ideal of motherhood as scientific managerialism:  child-cen-
tered caretaking based a blend of “Dr. Spock” style expert advice and total emo-
tional immersion. See JUDITH WARNER, PERFECT MADNESS: MOTHERHOOD IN THE
AGE OF ANXIETY (2005); SUSAN J. DOUGLAS & MEREDITH W. MICHAELS, THE
MOMMY MYTH: THE IDEALIZATION OF MOTHERHOOD AND HOW IT HAS UNDER-
MINED WOMEN (2004).
398 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, § 2.03(5)(c). R
399 Harvard Medical School professor Robert Brooks explains:  “‘Is there really
any difference between asking a child to do a chore versus asking a child to help
out?’  I believe it is far more than a question of semantics.  I think that children are
more willing to do things and more likely to develop a responsible attitude, when
they feel that they are being helpful.”  Robert Brooks, Fostering Responsibility in
Children: Chores or Contributions? Part I , Nov. 1999, at  http://www.drrobert
brooks.com/writings/articles/9911.html.
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ship of persons sharing a unique and insoluble bond.”400  How-
ever, Scott’s conception is not coterminous with the ALI
definition.  Scott’s definition of parenting is not about actually
engaging in caretaking activities—it is about the value and im-
portance that individuals attach to those activities.  Similarly,
Thomas Laqueur argues for a conception of parenthood as
“psychic labor.”401  Laqueur claims that “moral concern and ac-
tion are engendered . . . by the degree to which the emotional
and imaginative connections which entail love or obligation have
been forged.”402  This sort of attitude is a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for parenting under the ALI definition.
The ALI definition is far more “hands-on.”  The premise is
that actual performance of caretaking is a proxy for psychic
labor:
How caretaking was divided in the past provides a relatively
concrete point of reference which is likely to reflect various
qualitative factors that are otherwise very hard to measure, in-
cluding the strength of the emotional ties between the child
and each parent, relative parental competencies, and the will-
ingness of each parent to put the child’s interests first.403
Those with an emotional investment in children, but no con-
comitant chance to engage in the childcare activities, have no
standing to sue.  Julie Shapiro argues that in relationships where
couples divide labor along breadwinning/caretaking lines, “the
primary breadwinner will be unable to claim de facto
parenthood.”404  Although the standard is phrased in gender-
neutral terms, in many heterosexual couples, it is likely to favor
women over men.405  Martin Malin argues that “most men desire
a greater role in child care but are precluded from it by signifi-
cant workplace barriers.”406  Similarly, Loken argues, “grandpar-
ents, who have won the right in virtually every state to petition
for visitation at least under some circumstances, would be pre-
cluded from initiating such a proceeding in court and would be
400 Catania, Jr., supra  note 231, at 860-61 (quoting Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational R
Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce,  76 VA. L. REV. 9, 25 (1990)).
401 Thomas Laqueur, The Facts of Fatherhood , in DEBATES IN FEMINISM 433, 439
(Evelyn Fox-Keller & Maryanne Hirsch eds., 1990).
402 Id.
403 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, at I8. R
404 Shapiro, supra  note 236, at 779.
405 This standard has the potential to effect same-sex couples as well, insofar as it
“may mirror the common breadwinner/homemaker form.” Id.  at 780.
406 Marty Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave , 72 TEX. L. REV. 1047, 1049 (1994).
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able to intervene in ongoing custody proceedings only in ‘excep-
tional cases.’”407
Furthermore, parents are presumed to have the financial re-
sources to engage in, or delegate, a wide range of activities, even
some that may seem supplemental, such as “special [educational]
services appropriate to the child’s . . . interests.”408  All of the
activities on the list could be better performed by persons with
the financial stability and job flexibility to take time out from
work or hire a caregiver.  Mary Romero writes that caretakers
today have a great deal of legal responsibility with little public
support.409  Some mothers may “find no other option than to
leave their children alone in order to take the mandated low-
paying dead-end jobs.”410  Just as common law marriage served
the function of privatizing female dependency at a time when
public institutions did not have the resources to cope with the
problem, functional parenthood creates incentives for persons
with private resources to care for children.411  By engaging in the
wide range of parenting activities listed by the ALI, functional
parents receive continuing rights to children.
Interestingly, hired caregivers are not eligible to apply for sta-
tus as functional parents.412  This may be reflective of a racial/
class bias.413  One commentator asks, “[i]s a rarely present bio-
logical father more part of the child’s family than a loving, ever-
present, in-house nanny?”414  More likely, it is a response to
commodification anxiety: although parenting, like marriage, re-
quires serious investment and commingling of economic re-
407 Loken, supra  note 76, at 1053 (citation omitted).
408 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, § 2.03(5). R
409 Mary Romero, Bursting the Foundational Myths of Reproductive Labor Under
Capitalism: A Call for Brave New Families or Brave New Villages? , 8 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 177 (2000).
410 Id.  at 179 (citing KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET:  HOW
SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE WORK 125 (1997)).
411 See  Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Care , 76 CHI.-KENT. L. REV.
1403 (2001) (arguing for public supports for those who care for dependents).
412 The definition of a de facto parent specifies that the parenting must be “for
reasons primarily other than financial compensation.” ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note
71, § 2.03(1)(c)(ii). R
413 Domestic workers are disproportionately poor women of color.  Peggie R.
Smith, Organizing the Unorganizable: Private Paid Household Workers and Ap-
proaches to Employee Representation,  79 N.C. L. REV. 45, 53 (2000) (citing BUREAU
OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, HOUSEHOLD DATA ANNUAL AVER-
AGES, EMP. & EARNINGS, 166 tbl.11 (Jan. 2000)).
414 Alessia Bell, Note, Public and Private Child:  Troxel v. Granville and the Con-
stitutional Rights of Family Members , 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225, 226 (2001).
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sources, it cannot be for profit.  A parent is a woman the child
calls mother or a man the child calls father.  Parenting and mar-
riage are functional relationships, but they transcend the
utilitarian.415
The ALI Principles are premised on a formalist impulse to sys-
tematize family law.416  This creates anxieties for those who see
the family as a special domain of highly contextualized interac-
tions that should be evaluated on an ad hoc basis with more judi-
cial discretion.417  Unlike the Oregon statute, the social world
envisioned by the ALI is one in which the law ensures that each
child has one or two legal parents who perform vital caretaking
functions; other adults are legal strangers.418  Julie Shapiro ex-
plains a problem with this policy from the perspective of steppar-
ents: “A stepmother, even though she may care for the child the
majority of the time the child is in her home. . . may also fail to
qualify as a de facto parent.”419  If the child resides in the legal
mother’s home for a majority of time, that mother likely per-
forms a majority of the caretaking functions.  However, “the fa-
ther, who may perform no caretaking functions at all, will retain
legal entitlement vis-a`-vis the child.”420  The presumption that
one or two people might regularly perform all caretaking tasks is
culturally specific.  Lucie White writes that many African-Ameri-
can families organize caretaking “through extended family net-
works and community-based caretaking institutions.”421
Functional parenthood also has subversive dimensions.  The
ALI Principles force the question, “Does parental status begin
and end with the biological link, or, on the contrary, is it the case
that ‘parents are as parents do’?”422  By exposing parenthood as
performance, a mere copy of conventional ideas about parenting,
functional parenthood taps into broader debates about the
415 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Horton Looks at the ALI Principles,  4 J.L. &
FAM. STUD. 151, 155 (2002) (“[T]he ALI Principles seem to assume that couples who
commit to a child are engaging in an arms length objective transaction. To the con-
trary, love and parenthood are essentially irrational commitments.”).
416 See supra  Part II.B.
417 See, e.g. , Woodhouse, supra  note 415, at 165 (“[T]he ALI Principles place val- R
ues of efficiency over individualized justice for children.”).
418 See supra  note 73. R
419 Shapiro, supra  note 236, at 780.
420 Id.
421 Lucie E. White, Closing the Care Gap that Welfare Reform Left Behind,  577
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 131, 134 (2001).
422 Wagner, supra  note 108, at 1176.
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changing meaning of the family in U.S. society.  As Nancy Poli-
koff writes, “[d]eviation from the one-mother/one-father pre-
scription for parenthood is common.  Communal child rearing,
surrogacy, open adoption, stepfamilies, and extramarital births
all destroy the myth of family homogeneity.”423  It is unclear
whether or not functional parenthood can be utilized by non-
traditional “parents” to parody social norms and legal
classifications.
C. Identity Determination
1. Whiteness
Doctrines of race determination recognizing whiteness as per-
formance played fundamentally conservative roles in the antebel-
lum South.  These conservative roles included both shoring up
normative premises about the value of whiteness, as well bolster-
ing segregation as a totalizing institution by classifying persons of
contested racial status on one or the other side of the color line.
Most obviously, these doctrines reflected and reaffirmed white
supremacy by positing that acting white meant acting out “moral-
ity, virtue, [and] civic ability” and acting black meant behaving in
accord with a degraded status.424  In order to meet a performa-
tive standard of whiteness, claimants were required to endorse
valorizing stereotypes about whites and degrading stereotypes
about blacks.  Thus, “raising a whiteness claim was a double-
edged sword.”425  In order to secure freedom, rights, and privi-
leges, a claimant was required to propagate the very stereotypes
that justified the systems of slavery and segregation.
Performative definitions of race were not only marshaled by
individuals seeking freedom from slavery; indeed, the argument
was often used in order to classify persons as slaves.  In some
cases, the performative definition of race resulted in more people
being labeled as “black” than a biological, blood quantum defini-
tion would have.426  In the annulment case, Ferrall v. Ferrall , the
plaintiff argued against a one-eighth blood quantum rule, which
had been interpreted by North Carolina courts “to mean three
generations removed from a ‘pure African’ ancestor.”427  The
423 Polikoff, supra  note 75, at 474.
424 Gross, supra  note 112, at 182. R
425 Id.
426 Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1505-06. R
427 See supra  note 242. R
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\84-2\ORE205.txt unknown Seq: 80 18-NOV-05 13:17
642 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84, 2005]
plaintiff argued that the statute fixed as black the “descendant of
any person whose social status, associations and daily living
stamped him as being a negro.’”428  This performative definition
would have had designated more people as black than the rigid
“one-eighth rule.”429  Thus, evidence of performance “was in-
voked to assure the triumph of one-drop extremism” and “the
social construction of race threatened to replace fractional defini-
tions of race with an even more oppressive regime.”430
These doctrines were also conservative insofar as they rein-
forced the role of the state in policing the color line.  These per-
formance-based doctrines preserved the expectations of the
community, promoted clarity in racial determination, and re-
duced overzealous prosecution of individuals who had success-
fully assimilated into white communities.431  Additionally, such
doctrines served the political function of making the institution
of slavery more palatable by appeasing concerns over “white
slavery.”432
These rules of race determination also worked to stabilize in-
stitutions of slavery and segregation by providing for ease of clas-
sification.  Performance reification in the race context suppressed
potentially subversive borderline figures: those whose racial sta-
tus was not overdetermined by appearance and ancestry.  Prior
to challenges to the institution of slavery, persons identified as
“mulattoes” occupied a separate status from slaves.433  The “one-
drop rule” became popular at a time when it was seen as neces-
sary to create clear dividing lines and “preserve an imperiled
sense of White superiority.”434  By placing these figures on one
or the other side of the color line, the doctrine assisted the South
in its efforts to avoid confrontation with the fundamental impos-
sibility of defining race, and therefore, the hypocrisy of race-
based segregation.435
428 Id.
429 Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1505. R
430 Id.  at 1506.  “Although the state supreme court was not ultimately convinced,
this argument did persuade the trial judge to rule for the plaintiff notwithstanding a
jury verdict in favor of his wife.” Id.
431 See supra  Part I.C.2; Sharfstein, supra  note 114, at 1476, 1507. R
432 See supra  Part I.C.2; Gross, supra  note 112, at 150. R
433 Kenneth E. Payson, Comment, Check One Box:  Reconsidering Directive No.
15 and the Classification of Mixed-Race People , 84 CAL. L. REV. 1233, 1245-46
(1996).
434 Id.  at 1244.
435 See  Zackodnik, supra  note 239, at 424. (“Though social relationships in R
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This was also effected through the law’s self-referentiality in
defining race.  Gross notes the circularity of a doctrine that posits
that acting white means exercising the formal rights of whiteness:
In order to exercise rights, one must be white; in order to be
white, one must exercise rights . . . .  Part of the reason wit-
nesses repeatedly gave evidence of race in terms of legal rights
and disabilities is because the law undergirded so much of
what people understood racial identity to mean in the nine-
teenth-century South.  Embedded in their very way of speak-
ing or conceiving various relations and identities—identities
formed in and through relations to others—was law.436
Whiteness here is defined, not by reference to an internal natu-
ral status, nor by reference to an external social identity, but by
reference to legal form.  To be white was to execute the legal
formalities of whiteness: voting, testifying in court, joining the
militia.  Such an argument carefully sidesteps debates over bio-
logical determinism versus social construction437 in order to pre-
serve settled expectations of whiteness as legal property.
Gross cautions against using this insight to “engender a sense
of helplessness about the hegemonic function of law.”438  Al-
though she would not suggest that the nineteenth-century South
was a performativity theorist’s dream: “a free-wheeling world in
which people could ‘try on’ racial identities as they pleased with
plenty of room for experimentation,” there was indeed “room for
the ‘contestability’ of racial definition under the law.”439  The dis-
cretion of juries and “the discourse of race as performance al-
lowed some individuals who inhabited the constantly shifting
‘middle ground’ of race to challenge their own place in the hier-
archy [through] claims of whiteness.”440
America were everywhere miscegenated since the arrival of the first Dutch slaver
and enslaved Africans in the colonies, courts of law have attempted to clarify and
regiment those relationships in order to preserve a distinction between white and
black.”).
436 Gross, supra  note 112, at 163. R
437 As has been noted by many commentators, in the context of race, arguments
based on social construction are not necessarily progressive. See, e.g , Sharfstein,
supra  note 114, at 1504 (noting that “radical segregationists” argued against what R
they perceived as permissive judicial standards on the meaning of race by describing
those standards as “mere social constructions”).
438 Gross, supra  note 112, at 181. R
439 Id.  at 182.
440 Id.
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2. Sex
Would possibilities for parodies of gender norms be opened by
applying the logic of adverse possession to cases involving sex
determination?  The figure of the transvestite can serve as par-
ody through defiance of the concept of stable gender essences.
Yoshino suggests that the “significant minority” of decisions ac-
cepting that “the transsexual can become her postoperative sex
. . . suggests judicial receptivity to the concept of sex as a
performative category that might inspire some optimism about a
broader judicial embrace of such a conception.”441  Transvestites
may not consistently dress in the attire of men or women.  They
may hold themselves out to the public as men in feminine attire
or women in masculine attire.  This performance disrupts the sys-
tem of binary gender identity but it is generally not accepted by
the public as “authentic.”
Applying the doctrine of adverse possession to gender identity
is likely to involve more conservative repetition than parody.  As
Yoshino argues about the transsexual cases: “[t]he facially
performative discourse of these courts keeps falling back into a
kind of essentialization of sex.”442  Transvestites must behave
“consistently and continuously” as members of the opposite sex,
seamlessly blending in to societal expectations.  Furthermore this
performance must be under a “claim of right.”  Hence, in the
case of sumptuary laws, transsexuals are more capable than
transvestites of effectively claiming “squatter’s rights” to gender
identity, because transsexuals are more likely to make a claim to
one particular gender identity.  They are also more likely to con-
sistently behave like someone of their claimed sex, hold them-
selves out to the public as such, and be accepted as legitimate.
To require that this performance be consistent and successful in
terms of public acquiescence is to entirely defeat the possibility
for effective parody.  Parody is only possible if at some point it is
apparent that the performance does not match a stable essence.
If Jane/John Doe can always go into either the men’s room or the
women’s room, but not both, at work without complaint, she will
never challenge the coherence of the sex/gender system.  These
legal doctrines will not protect “individuals who are challenging
the obligatory two-gender system by blending public features of
maleness and femaleness and/or taking bits and pieces of surgical
441 Yoshino, supra  note 191, at 920.
442 Id.  at 921-22.
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options without ‘going all the way.’”443  Some transgendered
people “disrupt gender by refusing to provide the kinds of cues
that would accommodate either a male or female gender attribu-
tion and by treating biological signs of gender (including geni-
tals) as bodily ornaments—neither more nor less elective than a
face lift.”444
Unlike the other squatter’s rights doctrines, which are justified
on contractual, functional, or institutional grounds, the case of
gender identity is prone to status-based understandings.  Many
preoperative transsexuals, such as the plaintiff in Zanders , claim
that the outward manifestations of their biological sexes do not
reflect their true inner gender identities.445  Surgery and cross-
dressing are therefore necessary to bring their appearances into
line with their gendered essences.  The transsexual individual
wants a seamless sex/gender identity that others can rely on.
These performances reinforce the stability of the sex/gender sys-
tem by confirming that a person has a gendered core, and the
project of medicine is to ensure that his or her biological sex is a
match.  Yoshino explains, “like nested Russian dolls, the female
soul is nested inside a male body which is nested inside a female
performance.”446
Why have legal understandings of sex/gender never made the
move from status to contract?  Perhaps it is because of the obsti-
nacy of biologically based characterizations of sex.447  But
parenthood is also readily characterized as biological.  As the
ALI Principles demonstrate, many progressives view parenthood
as more functional than biological.  Why are the functional
dimensions of parenting foregrounded, while the functional
dimensions and legal interests in the sex/gender system are con-
sistently backgrounded?  Foregrounding the functional interests
in parenthood serves to better privatize the dependency of chil-
dren, which is considered an important public goal.448
443 Kessler, supra  note 303, at 121 (internal citations omitted). R
444 Id.  at 122.
445 City of Columbus v. Zanders, 266 N.E.2d 602, 603 (Mun. Ct. Ohio 1970).
446 Yoshino, supra  note 191, at 922.
447 I am not making the claim that there is no biological component to sex. See
supra  note 261.  However, I do claim that the legal discourse emphasizes the biologi- R
cal over other characterizations.
448 But see  Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law,
and Desire,  101 COLUM. L. REV. 181 (2000) (arguing that proposals to provide state
resources for child caretakers are premised on an irrational bias towards
“repronormativity”).
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Foregrounding the functional interests in sex/gender merely
often exposes them as trivial, irrational, or tautological.449
One reason that marriage and parenthood are resistant to the
contract analogy is pervasive commodification anxiety: these in-
stitutions are economic arrangements valued precisely because
they transcend the economic.  It is hard to imagine that a con-
tractual view of gender as a freely chosen agreement would cre-
ate commodification anxiety.  While marriage and parenthood
are exalted as transcendent relationships, gender is degraded as
natural status.  Wendy Brown argues that the history of political
theory has been a story of how “necessity, the body, and sensual-
ity as well as women . . . have been pushed out or pushed down,
scorned, or demeaned.”450  Even if gender is exalted, isn’t the
individual the only person who can say what gender is stamped
on his or her “soul”?
Arguably, a contract-based model of sex in which individuals
are free to self-identify as men or women would be preferable to
the biologism of the status quo.  However, the example of race
determination demonstrates that a move from status to contract
to performance would not necessarily open more space for gen-
der parody.  Recognition of performance may indeed unmoor
gender from a status-based biological grounding.  However, legal
formalization of certain gendered performances as “male” or “fe-
male” is by definition solidification of gendered stereotypes.
Culture, as opposed to biology, becomes deterministic.  Individu-
als still do not have the ability to opt out of the sex/gender sys-
tem, nor to reconfigure its terms.  The price of legal rights is
adherence to a rigid script of felicity conditions.  The recognition
that sex is performative does not mean that legal labels should be
attached to gendered performances.
449 See  United States v. Biocic, 928 F.2d 112, 116 (4th Cir. 1991) (Murnaghan, J.,
concurring).  Biocic, a woman prosecuted for topless sunbathing, argued that the law
discriminated against her on the basis of sex. Id.  at 114.  Judge Murnaghan specu-
lated that perhaps one day we will see the prosecution of Biocic as “trifling—per-
haps even childish—a matter for a community to spend time and energy
addressing.” Id.  at 118.
450 Wendy Brown, Where is the Sex in Political Theory? , 7 WOMEN & POLITICS 3,
5 (1987) (arguing that in the tradition of political theory, women become synony-
mous with the body, sex, and sexuality, and men become disassociated with sex and
regarded as political subjects).
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IV
WHEN SHOULD LAW REIFY PERFORMANCE?
When should the law formalize a performance?  If the goal is
to allow more opportunities for parody of repressive social
norms, then law should recognize performance when doing so
does not constrain variability, but rather, opens up opportunities
for new parodic performances.  In his reconceptualization of the
right to privacy, Jed Rubenfeld argues for this principle:
People do not [m]eaningfully govern themselves if their lives
are subtly but pervasively molded into standard, rigid, normal-
ized roles.  They simply reproduce themselves and their social
institutions.  A people may of course choose to reproduce
their state; but they must be free in order to choose to do so.
At a certain point, state control over the quotidian, material
aspects of individuals’ lives—even where the people have
democratically imposed such control themselves—deprives
them of this freedom.451
Where is that point?  How can the legal forms of social institu-
tions be crafted to ensure values such as predictability and stabil-
ity, allowing people to plan their lives, without imposing this sort
of control?  Are there important, countervailing third-party and
societal interests in uniformity in property, marriage,
parenthood, race, and sex?
Whether or not law should recognize performance depends on
what sort of performance is at issue.  Is the question whether or
not the performance is indicative of “true status”?  To say the law
should formalize that sort of performance makes the underlying
notion of “true status” more robust.  To agree to an idea such as
this is to foreclose any chance of social contestation—a danger-
ous proposition.  Furthermore, whenever the idea of “true sta-
tus” exists apart from a functional, contractual, or performative
definition, anxieties over fraud arise and the doctrine becomes
politically untenable.
Perhaps the performance is mimicry of contract?  Did some-
one agree to undertake all the functions of ownership, marriage,
parenthood, racial or gender status in reliance on the acquies-
cence of the community?  This notion of “choice” is too thin, for
performance reification requires legal definition of exactly what
persons engaged in ownership, marriage, parenthood, race, and
gender are supposed to do, constraining autonomy.  Further-
451 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy,  102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 805 (1989).
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more, these institutions are not contracts, strictly speaking.  Al-
though individuals must agree to enter them, they cannot change
the terms—they must agree to the standard package of rights and
duties, with little room for variation.  The contractual view often
gives way to commodification anxieties about the degradation of
a transcendent status.  For example, the argument that the func-
tional parent is not just a caretaker, but rather the true parent,
possessed of the “soul” of a parent.  This sort of status idea both
opens and closes space for performative notions of identity.
Yoshino explains:
The virtue of the soul is that it cannot be known except
through behavioral signifiers—the indicia of the soul are thus
performative indicia.  The soul thus effectively reifies the
performative acts in which the individual engages, but dis-
guises that project of invention as a project of detection . . . .
[T]he essentialist substrate has not been rejected, but rather
shifted from body to soul.452
Finally, is the performance mimicry of legal form itself?  Did
the claimant behave in ways that communicated to third parties
that she was the legal owner, spouse, parent, white/black, man/
woman?  Should their expectations be protected?  Formalization
of such a performance may do little to help individuals seeking
legal rights because of the circularity of the rule that only those
who execute legal formalities are entitled to do so.  Furthermore,
legal recognition of this performance may serve to protect the
hegemonic form of the legal institution in question, preventing
questioning about the value of the standardized institutional
form, and eliminating any space for individuals to opt out.
There are no easy answers to these questions.  Tentatively, the
law should formalize performance where the reliance interests,
institutional concerns, and expressive and functional values of
endorsing certain patterns of behavior are deemed to be of great
importance.  However, these considerations must be balanced
against the potential autonomy interests of other claimants, the
chance that status-based views or other expectations will be re-
ified, and the likelihood that formalizing patterns of performance
will only prevent more systemic reforms to faulty standard insti-
tutional packages.  Certain legal doctrines may tend to open
space for reexamination of the normative ideas behind institu-
tions, while others may tend to close it.
452 Yoshino, supra  note 191, at 922 (citation omitted).
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The legal rules involving adverse possession, common law mar-
riage, equitable parenthood, and race determination provide cer-
tain opportunities for claimants to parody norms about
ownership, marriage, parenting, and race.  For example, the doc-
trine of adverse possession recognizes “acting as if” one was the
legitimate owner, and that standard is contextualized to the par-
ticular type of property.  Such contextualization opens space for
claims that nontraditional ownership practices, such as conserva-
tion activities, deserve legal recognition.  Even without a success-
ful legal claim, social movements may be able to mobilize around
arguments that the logic of these doctrines requires reform.  Fur-
thermore, the success of such a claim has the potential to alter
the very meaning of ownership itself.
Formalization of performance, where that performance is
mimicry of legal form, makes the most sense when the standard
package provided by the legal institution is normatively sound.
Legal institutions such as property, marriage, and parenthood
impose a standard bundle of rights and duties.453  Is this justi-
fied?  By contrast, with regards to contract, “there is a potentially
infinite range of promises that the law will honor.”454  Although
the “building blocks” are limited, the system creates the potential
for tailoring of property rights through recombinations of old
forms.455  Of course, this begs the question:  is the law providing
good building blocks?  Are the rules of recombination such that
substantial freedom remains for those inside, outside, and on the
borders of these institutions?
In the context of marriage, however, the arguments for the
available institutional forms are not as strong.  Although mar-
453 Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith build a case for a small number of standard-
ized forms in the context of property rights. They reason:
When property rights are created, third parties must expend time and re-
sources to determine the attributes of these rights, both to avoid violating
them and to acquire them from present holders.  The existence of unusual
property rights increases the cost of processing information about all prop-
erty rights.  Those creating or transferring idiosyncratic property rights can-
not always be expected to take these increases in measurement costs fully
into account, making them a true externality.
Merrill & Smith, supra  note 251, at 8.  Merrill and Smith intend to update the “out- R
moded formalism” of theorizing about property with law and economics arguments.
Id.  at 6.
454 Id.  at 4.  Merrill and Smith describe this principle as “numerus clausus” mean-
ing “the number is closed.” Id.  They conclude that numerus clausus in the realm of
property rights is not a significant infringement on contract liberty.
455 Id . at 8.
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riage was certainly a one-size-fits-all “status contract” during the
heyday of common law marriage, today there are a wider variety
of options for individuals seeking to define their domestic rela-
tions, including civil unions, domestic partnerships, private con-
tracts, and covenant marriages.456  Jana Singer argues that “the
increased legal acceptance of consensual alternatives to marriage
and the decreased use of marital status as the basis for allocating
public benefits and burdens allow individuals to choose other,
less hierarchical, forms of intimacy without forfeiting important
material and psychic benefits.”457  Martha Ertman has argued for
even further flexibility based on the business law model: “busi-
ness law’s flexibility is compatible both with the various ways
that people order their intimate lives and the range of legal and
institutional responses to those arrangements.”458  Ertman “ex-
plores how the partnership model, the corporate model, and the
limited liability company . . . model are similar in some ways to
cohabitation, marriage, and polyamory.”459  With this array of
options, common law marriage makes little sense.  Why should
the entire standard package of marriage be imputed to a couple
when they had so many potential choices?460  Common law ap-
proaches to marriage risk entrenching the idea that there is one
standard form and preventing analysis of alternatives.
Third-party interests in quickly “determin[ing] the attributes of
these rights, both to avoid violating them and to acquire them
from present holders” are not as salient in the marriage context
as in the property context, where standard forms and the title
system facilitate alienability.461  Determining quickly who is and
456 Paula L. Ettelbrick, Domestic Partnership, Civil Unions, or Marriage: One
Size Does Not Fit All , 64 ALB. L. REV. 905 (2001) (describing the move towards
recognition of domestic partnerships and civil unions); Lynne Marie Kohm, A Com-
parative Survey of Covenant Marriage Proposals in the United States , 12 REGENT U.
L. REV. 31 (1999-2000) (describing “covenant marriage” statutes, which allow
spouses to elect to marry without the option of no-fault divorce); Jennifer K. Rob-
bennolt & Monica Kirkpatrick Johnson, Legal Planning for Unmarried Committed
Partners: Empirical Lessons for a Preventive and Therapeutic Approach , 41 ARIZ.
L. REV. 417 (1999) (describing contract options for cohabitating partners).
457 Singer, supra  note 360 at 1533-34. R
458 Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinc-
tion , 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 82 (2001).
459 Id.  at 84 (citations omitted).
460 This argument does not foreclose enforcing specific contracts between unmar-
ried cohabitating couples, for example, to divide property, as in Marvin v. Marvin,
557 P.2d 106, 115 (Cal. 1976).
461 Merrill & Smith, supra  note 251, at 8. R
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is not available for coupling does not seem to be an important
societal goal in the age of Internet dating; potential romantic
partners can lie and cheat on their commitments to others in any
case.  Taxation could be restructured to work with new forms of
intimate alliance.462  Likewise, parties would be forced to con-
tract for property rights upon death or dissolution of the relation-
ship.  Health care and employment benefits could be
restructured as well.  The advent of domestic partnership ar-
rangements has already forced many states and employers to re-
think these policies.463
However, in the context of parenthood, there may be argu-
ments for a standard institutional form based on third-party in-
terests:  those of children.  The ALI approach is premised on the
idea that the law should place a particular set of responsibilities
on particular adults for childcare.  In one sense, the ALI has
made parenthood a completely customizable contract.
Parenthood is an agreement that can be structured by the parents
themselves according to a parenting plan.464  Parents decide for
themselves their own custody and visitation arrangements, as
well as childcare responsibilities.  If an agreement breaks down,
courts allocate responsibility based on past patterns of perform-
ance.465  However, the parenting contract involves standard
building blocks:  there is a set of duties that must be allocated
between the parties.  The ALI defines the duties of parents from
a child-centered perspective:  each child has a list of needs that
someone must take permanent responsibility for fulfilling.466
Thus, Anne Alstott has described parenting as a “no exit obliga-
tion” and argues that because of this, the state should resource
caretakers.467  The ALI approach to functional parenthood
makes sense insofar as one agrees with the list of necessary child-
care tasks.  However, it raises questions about whether individu-
als should be expected to undertake these tasks without support
from private employers or the state.
462 See  Ertman, supra  note 458, at 109; Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the R
Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code , 40 UCLA L. REV.
983, 988 (1993) (arguing that the tax code serves as an “anchor against the emer-
gence of more modern and flexible family models” and suggesting alternatives).
463 Ertman, supra  note 458, at 108-09. R
464 Supra  note 232 and accompanying text. R
465 Supra  note 396. R
466 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 71, § 2.03(5). R
467 ANNE L. ALSTOTT, NO EXIT:  WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND
WHAT SOCIETY OWES PARENTS 52-72 (2004).
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Formalization of performance in the case of race determina-
tion makes little sense.  The idea that whiteness as an institution
should be linked to rights and benefits no longer holds grip as an
express ideology in U.S. politics.  The historical debate over ra-
cial definition as “colored” versus “white,” for purposes of segre-
gation, has shifted to a contemporary debate over the salience of
racial classification at all, even for remedial purposes in contexts
such as education and employment.468  Administration of reme-
dial programs may require a limited number of standard institu-
tional forms of race, signified by check boxes on institutional
paperwork.  Whether or not such standard institutional forms are
valuable depends on one’s opinion of the value of race-based re-
medial programs.469  Standard institutional forms of race may be
experienced as conservative and hegemonic insofar as individuals
do not identify with any of the listed options, object to certain
group labels, or do not subscribe to the concept of “race” at all.
However, in relying on voluntary self-identification of claimants
to racial identities, these forms provide opportunities for parody:
individuals may opt out freely, check multiple boxes, write in al-
ternatives, and so forth.  A performative model of racial determi-
nation is likely to be even less progressive, enforcing rigid labels
based on community definitions of race and racialized expecta-
tions for behavior.470
In the cases of sex determination, there are also strong argu-
ments against imposition of standard institutional forms such as
man/woman. The policy arguments for a stable, easily ascertain-
able, binary system of sex/gender are deeply linked to the kultur-
kampf over the meaning of marriage as a union of one man and
one woman.  These policy arguments should be analyzed with
knowledge of the potential individual freedom and variability
that is at stake.  Biologist Anne Fausto-Sterling has argued that
from an embryologic perspective, there are at least five sexes.471
She concludes that “sex is a vast, infinitely malleable continuum
468 See, e.g. , Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).  This debate is too exten-
sive to be rehashed here.  For outlines of the arguments, see Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring); Neil Gotanda, A Cri-
tique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”,  44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
469 An examination of the benefits and drawbacks of race-based remedial pro-
gramming is beyond the scope of this Article.
470 See supra  Part III.C.1.
471 Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female are Not Enough ,
SCIENCES 20, 20-24 (Mar.-Apr. 1993).  She lists males, females, true hermaphrodites,
female pseudohermaphrodites, and male pseudohermaphrodites. Id.
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that defies the constraints of even five categories.”472  Likewise,
Suzanne Kessler concludes from her research on intersexual indi-
viduals that “gender dichotomy is not a necessary feature of
human life.”473  Kessler concludes that we should accept varia-
tion and begin to take “gender less seriously” and treat “genital
formations as innate but malleable, much like hair.”474  To do so
would call into question compulsory heterosexuality as well:  “[i]f
gendered bodies fall into disarray, sexual orientation will follow.
Defining sexual orientation according to attraction to people
with the same or different genitals, as is done now, will no longer
make sense, nor will intersexuality.”475  Kessler’s hope is that
“[u]ltimately, the power of genitals to mark gender will be weak-
ened, and the power of gender to define lives will be blunted.”476
These considerations militate against a legal doctrine that would
utilize gendered performances to impose one or another gender
onto ambiguous social phenomena.
Analysis of the question “should law recognize performance?”
must proceed by examining the interests at stake in legal formali-
zation balanced against the loss of potential variability caused by
imposing a standardized form.
CONCLUSION
Property, marriage, parenthood, racial segregation, and the
sex/gender system can be understood in terms of private status,
public performance, and/or legal formality.  The ways that people
keep house: owning property, forming intimate relationships,
raising families, and identifying as members of racial groups or
genders, are certainly all “quotidian, material, aspects of individ-
uals’ lives,” and we should pause before accepting rigid legal def-
initions of these intimate personal freedoms.477  The doctrines of
performance reification give courts the job of adjudicating
whether people were really keeping house or merely playing
house.  Mere play is an inappropriate posture: these are serious
institutions that require universal adherence to maintain their
472 Id.
473 Kessler, supra  note 303, at 80. R
474 Id.  at 132.
475 Id.  at 124; see also  Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure ,
52 STAN. L. REV. 353, 357 (2000) (contesting the “straight/gay binary” and its era-
sure of bisexual desire and asexuality).
476 Id.
477 Rubenfeld, supra  note 451, at 805. R
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cultural hegemony.  But, if the number of available legal forms
and their concomitant bundles of rights and duties are not nor-
matively acceptable, then these doctrines, which impose those
forms onto ambiguous phenomena, are not acceptable either.
The law may protect public performances of property, mar-
riage, parenthood, race, and sex, but these protections are likely
to come at a cost.  Social actors will be required to hold them-
selves out to the public as conformists on a consistent and contin-
uous basis.  If the performance is not seamless, protection will be
denied.  Such conformity is likely to stifle individual creativity
and diffuse the potential of playful parodies to contest oppressive
institutions.
